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REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF
INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES AND PSYCHOACTIVE
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS UNDER
TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
INTRODUCTION
Disability rights advocates herald July 26, 1990 as the dawn of a new
era in civil rights protections;1 on that date President George Bush
signed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.2 The
ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled persons in employ-
ment, 3 public services,4 and public accommodations.5 In addition, the
1. See, eg., Julie M. Buchanan, A Dramatic Expansion of Rights and Remedies: the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Wis. LAW., Nov. 1991, at 16 (summarizing the Act's
main employment provisions and discussing its implications for personnel practices);
Tom Harkin, Our Newest Civil Rights Law: The Americans with Disabilities Act, 26
TRIAL, Dec. 1990, at 56 (providing a brief overview of the Act); Bonnie Milstein et al.,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Breathtaking Promise for People with Mental
Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1240 (1991) (analyzing the ADA as applied to
individuals with mental disabilities); Ann Devroy, In Emotion-Filled Ceremony, Bush
Signs Rights Law for America's Disabled, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at Al8 (describ-
ing the signing ceremony and outlining President Bush's speech); Don Shannon, Spirits
Soar as Disabled Rights Become the Law, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1990, at Al (same).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
II 1990); 29 U.S.C. §§ 706(8), 791-794 (1985 & Supp. 11 1990); and 47 U.S.C. §§ 225,
611 (1991)).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. II 1990), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12111-12112 (West Supp. 1992) (employers may not take adverse action
against disabled employees or applicants who are able to perform the essential functions
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Act requires employers,6 governments,7 public accommodations,' and
common carriers9 to accommodate the needs of disabled individuals.1"
This Note focuses on the application of ADA employment provisions"
to individuals with mental illnesses 2 and psychoactive substance use
of their jobs with or without reasonable accommodation to their needs). See infra notes
19-32 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the ADA employment
provisions.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. I 1990) (public entities may not exclude dis-
abled persons from participation in public services or programs if they meet the essen-
tial eligibility requirements with or without reasonable modifications of the services or
programs).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. 1 1990) (private entities may not exclude dis-
abled persons from public accommodations such as hotels, restaurants, auditoriums,
stores, public transportation stations, museums, parks, schools, social service centers, or
recreation facilities).
6. 41 U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(9) (Supp. H 1990), as amended by Nov. 21, 1991, 42
U.S.C.A. § 12111 (West Supp. 1992).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (Supp. I 1990).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1990).
9. 47 U.S.C. § 225(b) (1991) (the Federal Communications Commission must en-
sure that interstate and intrastate telecommunications relay services are available to
individuals with hearing and speech impairments).
10. Each title of the ADA contains a provision waiving the accommodation require-
ment upon a showing of serious hardship. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) and 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,734, 35,737 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)) (employers need not
accommodate if they can show undue hardship on the operation of their business); 42
U.S.C. § 12143(c)(4) (public entities may claim undue financial burden as a defense to
the reasonable modification requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (public ac-
commodations need not make modifications necessary to accommodate disabled indi-
viduals if such modifications would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the services); 47
U.S.C. § 225(b)(1) (telecommunications relay services must be provided "to the extent
possible and in the most efficient manner").
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Employers with 25 or more employees are subject to
the ADA as of July 26, 1992, while employers with between 15 and 25 employees need
not comply until July 26, 1994. Id. § 12111(5)(A). Employers with fewer than 15 em-
ployees are not subject to the ADA. See infra note 19 for the definition of "employer"
under the ADA.
12. A mental disorder is a
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs
in a person and that is associated with present distress (a painful symptom) or
disability (impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss
of freedom.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS xxii (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R]. Mental disorders
include clinical syndromes such as schizophrenia and major mood disorders, as well as
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disorders.13
Numerous commentators 14 have examined the nature of employers'
obligations to accommodate employees' physical disabilities under the
ADA and its more limited predecessor, the Federal Rehabilitation
Act.15 Only a limited number, however, focus on reasonable accom-
developmental and personality disorders such as mental retardation and antisocial per-
sonality disorder. Id. at 10, 16, 21, 28, 335.
13. Psychoactive substances include alcohol, amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine,
hallucinogens, and opioids. Id. at 169. "The essential feature of [psychoactive sub-
stance dependence] is a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiologic symptoms that
indicate that the person has impaired control of psychoactive substance use and contin-
ues use of the substances despite adverse consequences." Id. at 166. A substance
"abuser" uses psychoactive substances in a maladaptive way, while one who is "depen-
dent" typically exhibits tolerance and withdrawal as well. Id. at 166, 169. Tolerance is
a "need for increased amounts of alcohol [or other substances] to achieve the desired
effect or a diminished effect with regular use of the same amount." WILLIAM F. BANTA
& FOREST TENNANT, JR., COMPLETE HANDBOOK FOR COMBATING SUBSTANCE
ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE: MEDICAL FACTS, LEGAL ISSUES, AND PRACTICAL SOLU-
TIONS 106 (1989). Withdrawal consists of the "shakes," a malaise or other symptoms
"which are relieved by drinking [or use of another substance] after a period of cessation
of or reduction in [use]." Id.
14. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK OF JOB
ANALYSIS FOR REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION (1984) (suggesting a procedure for
planning accommodations and analyzing a job through identification of functional job
requirements and work environment factors); Elliot H. Shaller, "Reasonable Accommo-
dation" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act - What Does It Mean? 16 EMPLOYEE
REL. L.J. 431 (1991) (addressing the components of reasonable accommodation); C.
Geoffrey Weirich, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 7 LAB. LAW. 27 (1991) (same); Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 113 (1990) (advocating a
presumption favoring accommodations and suggesting a method to narrow the undue
hardship defense); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment:
The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1991) (comparing the concept of reasonable
accommodation with other approaches and outlining the substantive and procedural
duties placed upon employers under the ADA); Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable
Accommodation and Employment Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607 (1991) (discussing accommodation as an af-
firmative duty under the ADA); Margaret E. Stine, Comment, Reasonable Accommoda-
tion and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 37 S.D. L.
REv. 97 (1992) (exploring the terms "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hard-
ship"); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before Hardship Turns Undue? 59
U. CIN. L. REV. 1311 (1991) (suggesting that "undue hardship" and "reasonable ac-
commodation" are vague terms of art).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 706-794 (1985 & Supp. 11 1990). The Federal Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 prohibits handicap discrimination by federal agencies and recipients of federal
1993]
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modation of mental disabilities and substance use disorders. 16 Merely
two or three of the many examples of disabilities in the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretive guidelines on
the ADA concern mental or substance use problems. 17
This Note delineates an employer's duty to accommodate individu-
als with mental disabilities and substance use disorders among its
workforce. The first part of the Note reviews the elements of a plain-
tiff's claim, as well as an employer's defenses, under the ADA. Part I
also compares and contrasts the ADA with the Federal Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.18 Part II reviews an employer's obligation under both the
grants and contracts. See infra notes 18 and 33-63 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of the Rehabilitation Act.
16. Two articles address the application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to
mentally disabled persons, drug addicts, and alcoholics; neither focuses on reasonable
accommodation. See Patricia A. Maffeo, Making Non-Discriminatory Fitness-for-Duty
Decisions About Persons with Disabilities Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 279 (1990) (emphasizing pre-employ-
ment, fitness-for-duty determinations rather than post-employment accommodation);
Reese J. Henderson, Jr., Note, Addiction As Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics and
Drug Addicts Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 VAND. L. REv. 713
(1991) (reviewing broad contours of ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims by alcoholics
and drug addicts, with only passing references to accommodation). One exceptional
article discusses accommodation of alcoholics under the ADA in considerable detail.
See Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 895 (1992). Only one author addresses
accommodation of mental disorders under the Rehabilitation Act in significant detail.
See VIGDOR GROSSMAN, EMPLOYING HANDICAPPED PERSONS: MEETING EEO OBLI-
GATION S 53-60 (1980). Grossman does not address accommodation of substance use
disorders.
17. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,745 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r))
(determining whether a mentally ill employee poses a "direct threat" to the safety of
others); 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,745-46 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3(a)-(c))
(permitting discharge of a user of illegal drugs); and 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,752 (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(b)) (allowing employers to hold alcoholics and
drug users to uniform performance and conduct standards).
Recently the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission released a manual that
sheds more light on accommodation of mental illnesses and substance use disorders.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MAN-
UAL FOR THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL] at 111-22-23, 30-33 (suggesting possible accommodations for
mentally ill and mentally retarded employees), IV-I 1-14 (analyzing whether a mentally
ill individual poses a threat to others' safety), V-7-8 (prohibiting employers from asking
about psychiatric or substance use disorders or treatment history).
18. Congress modeled the ADA after the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which
contains three sections prohibiting discrimination against disabled persons. Applying to
federal agencies and to recipients of federal grants, § 504 reads in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States... shall,
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Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to accommodate persons with mental
disabilities and presents two illustrative case studies. Part III examines
the ADA's approach to psychoactive substance use disorders, which
departs considerably from the treatment of substance use problems
under the Rehabilitation Act. Lastly, Part III analyzes two case stud-
ies involving individuals with psychoactive substance use disorders.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Elements of a Title I ADA Claim and an Employer's
Potential Defenses
The ADA forbids covered entities19 to discriminate against qualified
solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service ....
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 503, which governs federal contrac-
tors, provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency
... shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such
contract, the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action
to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with handicaps ....
29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1985 & Supp. H 1990). Section 501 imposes similar affirmative
action obligations on federal agencies, in addition to the non-discrimination provisions
of § 504:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality (including the United States Postal
Service and the Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch shall... submit
to the [Civil Service] Commission... an affirmative action program plan for the
hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with handicaps.... Such plan
shall include a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the special
needs of employees with handicaps are being met ....
29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1985 & Supp. 11 1990). See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying
text for a more detailed discussion of the Federal Rehabilitation Act.
19. Congress defined "covered entity" as "an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). The term
"employer" means:
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except that, for two years
following the effective date of this subchapter, an employer means a person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year,
and any agent of such person.
Id. § 12111(5)(A).
Most federal contractors and grantees will be subject to both the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act, but federal agencies are excluded from ADA coverage. Id.
§ 12111(5)(B)(1).
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disabled individuals in hiring, promotion, termination, or any term or
condition of employment.2 ° An individual is disabled if he or she has a
physical or mental impairment2 that substantially limits22 one or more
20. The statute elaborates:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of such employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
For example, an employer may not inquire whether a job applicant is disabled or has
a history of a disability, but it may inquire whether the applicant can perform job-
related functions. Id. § 12112(d)(2)(A)(B). An employer may not require an applicant
to undergo a medical examination until it has made a conditional offer of employment,
and only then if all new employees must submit to such an exam. Id. § 12112(d)(3).
An employer may not require an employee to submit to a medical exam or inquire
whether an employee has a disability unless "such examination or inquiry is shown to
be job-related and consistent with business necessity." Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Employ-
ers must safeguard the confidentiality of medical records and use them only in accord-
ance with the purposes of the ADA. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(C).
21. The terms "physical or mental impairment" mean:
(I) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), car-
diovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)).
The existence of an impairment is determined without reference to mitigating factors
such as medications. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,740-41 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(h)).
22. A person is "substantially limited" when he or she is:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which
an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condi-
tion, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general popula-
tion can perform that same major life activity.
56 Fed. Reg. at 35,735 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)).
The following factors should be considered when evaluating whether an individual is
substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
56 Fed. Reg. at 35,735 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)).
An individual is substantially limited in the ability to work when "restricted in the
ability to perform" a range of jobs in comparison to others with similar skills and abili-
ties. However, "[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/12
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major life activities,2 3 has a record of such impairment," or is regarded
as having such an impairment.25 A qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" is a person who can perform the essential functions27 of his or her
job with or without reasonable accommodation28 of the disability. An
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,735 (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
23. "Major life activities" include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 56 Fed. Reg. at
35,735 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
24. A person has a "record of such impairment" if he or she "has a history of, or
has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities." 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,735 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)).
25. "Regarded as having such an impairment" means one who:
(I) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major
life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life ac-
tivities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined [above] but is treated by a covered
entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
56 Fed. Reg. at 35,735 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
27. Congress explained, "[c]onsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment
as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." Id. In determining
which job functions are essential, the EEOC and the courts will focus on "the purpose of
the functions and the result to be accomplished, rather than the manner in which the
function presently is performed." TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at
11-16.
28. Congress stated that "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable
by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
The ADA regulations call for an "informal, interactive process" between the covered
entity and the qualified disabled person to determine needed and feasible accommoda-
tions. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,748 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(o)(3) and app. § 1630.9). The legislative history describes four steps to this
negotiation process: (1) identify barriers to equal opportunity by distinguishing essen-
tial from non-essential job duties and identifying environmental impediments; (2) iden-
tify potential accommodations; (3) assess the reasonableness of each option in terms of
effectiveness, equal opportunity, reliability, and timeliness; and (4) implement the ac-
commodation that is most appropriate for both employer and employee and is not an
1993]
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employer or other covered entity must accommodate an employee or
applicant with a known disability29 unless the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship30 on its business. 31 In preparing their case
of discrimination, ADA plaintiffs utilize the procedures and remedies
afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32
Although the ADA does not specify the burdens of proof necessary
for each element, cases arising under the Rehabilitation Act outline a
complex scheme of shifting burdens of proof and persuasion. Congress
expressly intended to model the ADA burdens of proof after the Reha-
bilitation Act, as well as regulations and case law interpreting that
undue hardship. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 66 (1990); S. REP.
No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 35 (1989).
29. An employee has a duty to notify his or her employer of any disability that
requires accommodation. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 111-7.
30. "Undue hardship" means "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense"
after consideration of the following factors:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed...;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility .. .; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact other-
wise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the
number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the com-
position, structure, and functions of the workforce.. .; the geographic separate-
ness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility ... to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)-(B).
The House rejected a proposal to define as per se undue hardship any accommodation
costing more than 10% of the disabled employee's salary. The rule was set aside be-
cause it would disproportionately disadvantage lower-paid employees. 136 CONG. RFc.
H2471-75 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (debate of Rep. Olin's amendment); TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 111-15. Some commentators have raised the
question whether an employer may aggregate the costs of accommodating all employ-
ees' disabilities in formulating an undue hardship defense. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. FAIL-
LACE & HOWARD G. ZIFF, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
ADA, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
63, 81-82 (Alan M. Koral & Bruce McLanahan eds. 1990). The statute and regulations
are silent on this issue.
31. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,737 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Title VII creates an elaborate administrative and judicial
enforcement scheme and authorizes equitable remedies such as backpay and reinstate-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1981), as amended by Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5 (West Supp. 1992). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1077 (to be codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), amended
Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to authorize limited compensatory and
punitive damages and to allow for jury trials in cases of intentional discrimination.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/12
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Act.33 Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs have sued under three theories: in-
tentional, surmountable barrier, and disparate impact discrimination.34
Plaintiffs alleging intentional discrimination 35 must make a prima facie
showing that they are handicapped but otherwise qualified3 6 for a job,
and that their employer rejected or discharged them solely because of
their handicap.37 To avoid liability, the defendant must present evi-
dence that it rejected or terminated the plaintiff for reasons other than
the disability. 38 To overcome the defendant's proffered defenses, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant's reasons are merely pretexts for
handicap discrimination. 39
Surmountable barrier claims are more common 4° and constitute a
variation of intentional discrimination claims. The plaintiffs must first
make a facial showing that they are handicapped but otherwise quali-
fied for a position and that accommodation is feasible.41 The defendant
33. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 28, at 72; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 28, at 38.
34. Henderson, supra note 16, at 721-26.
35. The intentional discrimination theory under the Rehabilitation Act parallels the
Title VII disparate treatment burden of proof enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
36. The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
406 (1979), explained that plaintiffs are "otherwise qualified" if they are able to meet all
program requirements "in spite of [their] handicap." See infra notes 55-61 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the controversy surrounding this definition and the
different approach taken by the ADA.
37. See, e.g., Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 116 (8th Cir. 1985) (blind applicant
alleging rejection for librarian position because of handicap). In order for an employer
to take adverse action against an employee solely because of his or her handicap, the
employer must know about that handicap. See, e.g., Nuccio v. Frank, No. CIV.A.91-
3702, 1992 WL 124800, at *2 (E.D. La. May 28, 1992) (granting Postal Service's mo-
tion to dismiss Rehabilitation Act claim, where Service had no notice of plaintiff's al-
leged impairment of paranoid schizophrenia before it terminated her for absenteeism).
38. Norcross, 755 F.2d at 115-17 (noting defendant's rebuttal to plaintiff's prima
facie case and accepting defendant's assertion that it would not have rejected plaintiff
but for a better qualified applicant).
39. Id. But see Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th
Cir. 1981) (once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination,
employer has the burden of proof, not merely of production, to show that it was not
motivated by discriminatory purposes). See Murphy, supra note 14, at 1638-39 (critiqu-
ing the Pushkin burdens of proof scheme).
40. Murphy, supra note 14, at 1637.
41. See, eg., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981) (medical
student's initial admission to medical school did not establish that she was "otherwise
qualified" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act when admission was obtained
upon her false representation that she did not suffer from any recurrent illness or emo-
tional problems).
1993]
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can rebut with evidence that the plaintiffs are not qualified for the posi-
tion or that accommodation is impossible or unduly burdensome. 42 To
prevail, the plaintiffs must prove their qualifications and the feasibility
of accommodation.43
Disparate impact plaintiffs must show that they are qualified for the
disputed job except for a handicap, that the handicap precludes them
from meeting a neutral job qualification, and that the challenged quali-
fication has a disproportionate impact on them and others with similar
handicaps.' The plaintiffs must also make a facial showing that ac-
commodation is feasible.45 The defendant then has the burden to
prove that the challenged qualification is job-related 46 and that accom-
modation is infeasible or unduly burdensome.47
B. Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
In general, the ADA parallels the Rehabilitation Act,48 yet, there
are several notable differences. First, the scope of the ADA is far
broader than the Rehabilitation Act, for it applies to all employers en-
gaged in interstate commerce,4 9 not just those receiving federal
funds.5" Second, while the Rehabilitation Act continues to impose an
42. Id. at 776.
43. See Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1280 (8th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs must
present evidence "concerning [their] individual capabilities and suggestions for possible
accommodations") (quoting Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir.
1981)). But see Pushkin, 658 F.2d at 1387 (employer has the burden to prove plaintiff's
lack of qualifications or the infeasibility of accommodation).
44. See, e.g., Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir. 1981)
(outlining the requirements of a prima facie case); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F.
Supp. 758, 764 (D. Kan. 1988) (same).
45. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 310; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 764.
46. A qualification is job-related if it ensures that employees can perform the essen-
tial functions of their positions safely and efficiently. Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 310.
47. Id. at 309-10; Wallace, 683 F. Supp. at 764.
48. The Senate and House Committees explicitly recognized that "[t]he ADA in-
corporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in the regulations imple-
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to
provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in an undue hardship on the
operation of the business." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 28, at 23; S. RaP. No. 116,
supra note 28, at 2.
Congress selected the term "disability" for the ADA rather than "handicap" as used
in the Rehabilitation Act, not because of any difference in meaning, but because the
former term is less stigmatizing to disabled persons. S. REP. No. 116, at 21.
49. See supra note 19 for the jurisdictional language of Title I of the ADA.
50. See supra note 18 for the jurisdictional provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.
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affirmative action obligation on federal agencies and contractors, 5 the
ADA requires only reasonable accommodation of the needs of disabled
employees or applicants. Third, in order to establish a Rehabilitation
Act violation, plaintiffs must demonstrate that their handicap was the
sole reason52 for the adverse employment decision. Under the ADA,
plaintiffs need only show that the employer discriminated against them
"because of"5 3 their disability.5" Fourth, the Supreme Court in South-
eastern Community College v. Davis5 5 interpreted the terms "otherwise
qualified" in the Rehabilitation Act to protect only those who could
meet all program requirements "in spite of [their] handicap.",5 6 As a
result, many lower courts never reached the reasonable accommoda-
tion analysis because plaintiffs could not perform the essential func-
tions of the job despite their handicap.57 The Supreme Court changed
51. See supra note 18 for the Rehabilitation Act provisions requiring federal agen-
cies and contractors to provide affirmative action.
52. Section 504 provides in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added).
53. The relevant section of the ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
54. In this respect the ADA resembles Title VII more than § 504. Under Title VII,
a plaintiff need only show that his or her race or sex was a factor in, and not the sole
cause of, the adverse employment decision. Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 117 n.5
(8th Cir. 1985).
55. 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). Davis concerned the obligations of a federally-funded
nursing school toward its students and applicants. The Court held that a deaf applicant
was not "otherwise qualified" for nursing school where she would have required exten-
sive curriculum modifications and could have endangered patients during clinical
rounds. Id. at 407. Lower courts recognize that Davis governs § 504 suits against em-
ployers as well as educational institutions. See, eg., Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of
Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1981) (analyzing and adopting the Davis
approach).
56. In perhaps contradictory language, the Court also stated that a disabled individ-
ual could be "otherwise qualified" if the educational program could accommodate his
or her handicap without undue hardship. Davis, 442 U.S. at 412. Most lower courts
have failed to pick up on this apparent concession.
57. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761,775-77 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff
suffering from serious psychiatric and mental disorders failed to prove that, despite her
handicap, she was qualified for acceptance as medical student); Pushkin, 658 F.2d at
1385 (plaintiff suffering from multiple sclerosis supported finding that he was qualified
for psychiatric residency program apart from his handicap); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F.
19931
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its position in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,58 and imported
a reasonable accommodation analysis into the "otherwise qualified" in-
quiry.59 The ADA adopts the Arline approach and clarifies that dis-
abled people are qualified if they satisfy the education and skill
requirements of the job,6" and if, with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, they can perform the essential functions of the job. 61 Finally,
the Rehabilitation Act protected current drug and alcohol users as long
as their drug or alcohol use did not impair their work performance or
threaten the property or safety of others.62 The ADA revokes all pro-
tections for current users of illegal drugs, regardless of whether they
Supp. 1134, 1137 (D. Md. 1988) (plaintiff who could not travel safely or be trusted as a
negotiator was not an otherwise qualified person in spite of his handicap), aff'd, 888
F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989); Richardson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16
(D.D.C. 1985) (dismissal stemmed from criminal conduct, not from poor job perform-
ance due to alcoholism); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 82-126R, 1983 WL 636, at *7
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 1983) (plaintiff applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder was
not otherwise qualified due to his bad work history), aff'd on other grounds, 752 F.2d
410 (9th Cir. 1985). But see Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683 F. Supp. 758, 761-63 (D.
Kan. 1988) (noting that despite the language of Davis, many lower courts have factored
the legitimacy of the requirement and the feasibility of accommodation into the deter-
mination of whether a plaintiff is otherwise qualified). Some courts have tied the "rea-
sonable accommodation" and "otherwise qualified" inquiries together only in § 501
cases against federal agencies based upon the federal government's affirmative action
obligation. See, eg., Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 477-78 (11th Cir. 1983).
For further discussion of this ambiguity, see infra notes 97-103 and 198-203 and accom-
panying text.
58. 480 U.S. 273, 287-89 (1987).
59. The Court preserved the Davis rule but added the reasonable accommodation
analysis to it:
"An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's re-
quirements in spite of his handicap." [Davis, 442 U.S. at 406]. In the employment
context, an otherwise qualified person is one who can perform "the essential func-
tions" of the job in question. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985). When a handicapped
person is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, the court must also
consider whether any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable
the handicapped person to perform those functions.
480 U.S. at 288 n.17.
60. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).
The EEOC's TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 11-12, explains that
this preliminary inquiry, whether an individual satisfies the education and skill require-
ments, "is sometimes referred to as determining if an individual with a disability is
'otherwise qualified."'
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
62. The relevant language was added to the Rehabilitation Act in 1978:
[T]he term "handicapped individual"... does not include any individual who is an
alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such indi-
vidual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
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display impairment at work or endanger people or property.6 3
II. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF MENTAL DISABILITIES
UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA
A. Scope of the Problem
Approximately 43 million individuals in the United States have one
or more physical or mental disabilities. 64 Two-thirds of the disabled
persons between ages sixteen and sixty-four (8.2 million individuals) do
not work, although the majority of them desire employment.6 5 Indeed,
most are in dire need of work. In 1984, approximately fifty percent of
all disabled adults reported household incomes below $15,000, while
only twenty-five percent of non-disabled adults had comparably low
household incomes.66
Mental illnesses of various kinds afflict a sizable proportion of the
disabled population. Approximately 2.8 million Americans suffer from
severe psychiatric illnesses. 67 Up to seventy percent of these individu-
als are unemployed for sustained periods.68 Mentally ill individuals,
especially those with psychoses, demonstrate a lower success rate in
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others.
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (1978) (prior to 1986 amendment).
63. The ADA provides: "For purposes of this title, the term 'qualified individual
with a disability' shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging
in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." 42
U.S.C. § 12114(a). The ADA also amends the Rehabilitation Act to conform in this
respect. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 377 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A)-(C) (Supp. 111990)). For further discussion of the exclusion
of current drug users from the protection of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
see infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
64. Statement of Findings, Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1).
65. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 28, at 9.
66. Id.
67. NATIONAL INSTrTUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION POL-
ICY AND HOMELESSNESS 2 (1990).
68. H. Keith Massel et al., Evaluating the Capacity to Work of the Mentally Ill, 53
PSYCHIATRY 31, 31 (1990) (citing I. Goldstrom & R. Manderscheid, The Chronically
Mentally Ill: A Descriptive Analysis from the Uniform Client Data Instrument, 2 CoM-
MUNITY SUPPORT SERV. J. 4 (1982)); E. Sally Rogers et al., Psychiatric Rehabilitation
as the Preferred Response to the Needs of Individuals with Severe Psychiatric Disability,
33 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 5, 8 (1988) ("Studies suggest that no more than 20 to 30% of
individuals with psychiatric disability are competitively employed.").
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vocational rehabilitation than other disabled persons.6 9
B. Treatment of Mental Illnesses Under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act
Regulations under the ADA7' and the Rehabilitation Act7" prohibit
discrimination against qualified individuals with mental impairments,
including mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. To dispute the exist-
ence of a mental impairment is rare in cases brought under the Reha-
bilitation Act.72 Aside from isolated and unexceptionable exclusions,
courts have found the following impairments to qualify for protection
under the Rehabilitation Act: paranoid schizophrenia, 73 manic-de-
69. Michael McCue & Lynda Katz-Garris, The Severely Disabled Psychiatric Pa-
tient and the Adjustment to Work, J. RElAB., Oct.-Dec. 1983, at 52, 56. The rate of
success in vocational rehabilitation is 15 to 20% lower for persons with psychiatric
disabilities than for individuals with other disabilities. Howard Andrews et al., National
Trends in Vocational Rehabilitation: A Comparison of Individuals with Physical Disabili-
ties and Individuals with Psychiatric Disabilities, J. REHAB., Jan.-Mar. 1992, at 7, 14;
Shari Weisz Hirsch, Meeting the Vocational Needs of Individuals with Psychiatric Disa-
bilities through Supported Employment, J. REHAB., Oct.-Dec. 1989, at 26 (citing I.D.
Rutman, A Comprehensive, National Evaluation of Transitional Employment Pro-
grams for the Psychiatrically Disabled (1986) (unpublished paper)).
70. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,735 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b) (1991).
72. The D.C. Circuit found, for example, that homosexuality did not qualify as an
impairment under the Rehabilitation Act. Blackwell v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 830
F.2d 1183, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The district court in Blackwell held that the plaintiff,
a transvestite, could have come within the Rehabilitation Act had he given his employer
notice of his impairment. Blackwell v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 656 F. Supp. 713, 715
(D.D.C. 1986). The court of appeals did not reach the issue of transvestitism but va-
cated the portion of the district court opinion requiring a plaintiff to notify his or her
employer of the disability. 830 F.2d at 1183-84. The ADA specifically excludes trans-
vestitism, as well as other non-physiological sexual disorders, from coverage. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12208, 12211. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text for further discussion of
these exclusions.
The Second Circuit found that poor judgment and impulse control and irresponsible
behavior alone did not amount to impairments. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 214-15
(2d Cir. 1989). See also, e.g., Adams v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531, 1531 (D.D.C.
1989) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate a handicap where his "adjustment disorder" was
merely a reaction to an antagonizing supervisor and, therefore, was merely transitory),
aff'd per curiam, No. 89-5265, 1990 WL 45737 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 1990).
73. Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting
that paranoid schizophrenics may fall within the handicapped category). Schizophren-
ics experience disturbances in one or more of the following areas: "content and form of
thought, perception, affect, sense of self, volition, relationship to the external world, and
psychomotor behavior." DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 188.
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pression,74 depression,7 post-traumatic stress disorder,7 6 borderline
personality disorder,77 schizoid personality disorder,78 passive-aggres-
sive personality disorder,79 kleptomania,8° apraxia, 1 transsexual disor-
74. Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1279-80 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding, without
discussion, that manic depressive was terminated from overseas assignment because of
his handicap); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1184-85 (D. Md. 1985) (noting plain-
tiff's physical and mental impairments, including manic depression). Individuals in a
manic episode experience an unusually elevated or irritable mood, and may display
marked impairments in occupational or social functioning, grandiose ideas, decreased
sleep, pressured speech, agitation, and initiation of new projects. See DSM-III-R, supra
note 12, at 214-15. For at least two weeks, depressed individuals suffer from a de-
pressed mood or a "loss of interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities." Id. at
218. Associated symptoms include disturbances in sleeping and eating patterns, agita-
tion or sluggishness, loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness, difficulties with concentra-
tion, and suicidal thoughts. Id. at 219. Manic-depression is characterized by
fluctuating or simultaneous manic and depressive symptoms. Id. at 226.
75. Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402,
1408 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1983).
Post-traumatic stress disorder is an anxiety reaction to an extremely traumatic event,
characterized by recurrent recollections, dreams, flashbacks, or psychological distress;
avoidance of the traumatizing stimuli; and persistent symptoms of arousal. DSM-III-R,
supra note 12, at 250.
77. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing plaintiff's
history of psychiatric and mental problems); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1135-36
(D. Md. 1988) (questioning whether plaintiff suffering from borderline personality dis-
order was handicapped), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989). Persons with borderline
personality disorder display a "pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relation-
ships," impulsiveness, affective instability, inappropriate anger, recurrent suicidal
threats or self-mutilating behavior, identity disturbance, chronic feelings of emptiness,
and/or fears of abandonment. DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 347.
78. Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 513 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding that em-
ployer may have erred in concluding that plaintiff who suffered from a schizoid person-
ality disorder and alcoholism was not handicapped). Persons with schizoid personality
disorder form few social relationships and display a limited range of emotional expres-
sion. DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 340.
79. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir. 1981). Passive-aggressive
individuals persistently and passively resist demands for adequate social and occupa-
tional performance by procrastinating, arguing, sulking, deliberately working slowly,
complaining of excessive demands, forgetting obligations, exaggerating accomplish-
ments, resenting advice, and/or criticizing persons of authority. DSM-III-R, supra
note 12, at 357-58.
80. Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Md. 1988) (assuming, arguendo,
that plaintiff suffering from mental condition with symptoms of kleptomania was handi-
capped), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989). A kleptomaniac repeatedly fails to resist
impulses to steal items "not needed for personal use or their monetary value." DSM-
III-R, supra note 12, at 322. The ADA explicitly excludes kleptomania from coverage
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der,8 2 and mental retardation. 3  In reaction to some of these
precedents, Congress excluded homosexuality and bisexuality, 4 vari-
ous sexual behavior disorders, 5 compulsive gambling, kleptomania,
pyromania, and certain psychoactive substance use disorders16 from
coverage under the ADA.8 7
but does not amend the Rehabilitation Act to conform. 42 U.S.C. § 1221 1(b)(2). See
infra note 87 and accompanying text for further discussion of this exclusion.
81. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 394-96 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that plaintiff
was terminated because of his handicap which had caused him to perform his job
poorly). Apraxia is a neurological disorder causing high levels of distractibility. Id. at
394-95.
82. Doe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1867, 1869 (D.D.C.
1985) (finding that plaintiff adequately alleged a "physical or mental impairment"
under the Rehabilitation Act). The American Psychiatric Association explains,
The essential features of [transsexual disorder] are a persistent discomfort and
sense of inappropriateness about one's assigned sex in a person who has reached
puberty. In addition, there is persistent preoccupation, for at least two years, with
getting rid of one's primary and secondary sex characteristics and acquiring the sex
characteristics of the other sex.
DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 74.
The plaintiff in Doe came within the protections of the Rehabilitation Act because his
would-be supervisors regarded his transsexual disorder as impairing his ability to work.
The plaintiff pleaded a "medically and psychologically established need for gender reas-
signment surgery" from a man to a woman. 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1868.
Although the ADA excludes most sexual disorders from coverage, it allows those re-
sulting from physical impairments. 42 U.S.C. § 1221 1(b)(1). See infra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text for further discussion of these exclusions.
83. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
Mental retardation is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning
and deficits in living skills which appear before age 18. DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at
28.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a).
85. The relevant provision of the ADA states, "Under this chapter, the term 'disa-
bility' shall not include... (1) transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibition-
ism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or
other sexual behavior disorders . I..." Id. § 12211(b).
86. Id. § 12211(b)(2)-(3). Specifically, the ADA excludes "psychoactive substance
use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs." Id. § 1221 1(b)(3).
87. When the Senate Labor Committee reported the ADA to the Floor, the bill
contained no categorical exclusions for mental disorders. Several Senators expressed
apprehension that the ADA would sanction otherwise illegal or immoral conduct. Sen-
ator Rudman declared:
mhe bill could protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of a variety of
socially unacceptable, often illegal, behavior if such behavior is considered to be the
result of a mental illness. Some examples that come to mind are compulsive gam-
bling, pedophilia, and kleptomania. I have serious problems with this result.
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Establishing a mental impairment is merely the first step in a plain-
tiff's prima facie case. To recover under the ADA"8 and the Rehabili-
tation Act, 9 a plaintiff must also show that the impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities, that it has done so
in the past, or that he or she is regarded as having such a limit. Some
courts have been restrictive in interpreting this requirement under the
Rehabilitation Act. The Fourth Circuit," for example, held that a
utility systems repairman with acrophobia91 was not substantially lim-
ited in his ability to work because his impairment never previously in-
terfered with his work, nor did it preclude him from obtaining
employment that did not require climbing.92 The Second Circuit93
135 CONG. REc. S10,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Rudman). Con-
gressman Delay articulated the same concern during debates on the House bill. He
entered into the Record an op-ed piece that stated:
[Tihe amputee could be placed on the same level as the pedophile, the blind on the
same level as the transvestite. The consequences of this bill only trivializes [sic] the
struggle of the truly disabled to attain equal opportunity and access, and places
them in the same category with common criminals.
136 CONG. REc. H2322 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. Delay).
Senator Armstrong proposed, and the Senate passed, an amendment that specifically
excludes from coverage certain sexual disorders and other conduct-related disorders, as
well as some psychoactive substance use disorders. 135 CONG. REc. S10,785 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (reading of proposed Amendment No. 722). Senator Armstrong ex-
plained, "[I]f ADA is enacted the private sector will be swamped with mental disability
litigation. My amendment excludes some of the mental disorders that would have cre-
ated the more egregious lawsuits .... ." 135 CONG. Rc. Sl 1,176 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong). Section 12211 of the ADA embodies Senator
Armstrong's amendment.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c)-(e) (1991).
90. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934-35 (4th Cir. 1986).
91. Acrophobia is the fear of heights. DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 243.
92. The court added that the plaintiff's employer did not perceive him as handi-
capped just because he was "incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular
job." 794 F.2d at 934.
The ADA regulations conform to the Forrisi court's narrow interpretation of "sub-
stantially limit": "The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,735
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The regulations also list factors
for determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the area of working:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
pairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an im-
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found that a plaintiff's impulsive personality traits that precluded po-
lice department work, assuming they constituted impairments, did not
substantially limit his ability to find other work. Other courts have
practically dispensed with any analysis on this prong of the plaintiff's
prima facie case.9 4 Although the term "major life activities" encom-
passes more than just the ability to work," courts may be reluctant to
recognize a mental handicap in the absence of a substantial limitation
on one's ability to work.96
Mentally disabled plaintiffs have had considerable difficulty demon-
strating that they are "otherwise qualified" for their positions.9 7 The
Supreme Court's restrictive definition of "otherwise qualified" in
Southeastern Community College v. Davis" partly explains this
trend.99 Few individuals whose impairments substantially limit their
ability to work can perform their job functions in spite of their disabili-
pairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training,
knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the indi-
vidual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various
classes).
Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)).
93. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989).
94. See, eg., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding
that despite plaintiff's claim that she suffered no impairments in major life activities, her
borderline personality disorder did substantially limit her ability to handle medical
school); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting
that plaintiff's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia may substantially limit some of her
major life activities).
95. In fact, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines on the ADA require an employer to
consider an employee's ability to work only if the employee is not substantially limited
with regard to other major life activities. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,741 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j)).
96. See, eg., Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that
even though plaintiff suffered anxiety from his work-related travels and jeopardized his
credibility as a labor negotiator by repeatedly shoplifting, plaintiff was not substantially
limited where most of his problems stemmed from off-duty conduct), aff'd, 888 F.2d
1385 (4th Cir. 1989).
97. E.g., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1408-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (suicidal therapist not qualified to treat depressed pa-
tients); Fields, 705 F. Supp. at 1136-37 (depressed federal employee who suffered from
anxiety and had kleptomaniac tendencies was not otherwise qualified to perform job as
labor negotiator).
98. 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979). See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text discuss-
ing Davis.
99. The courts in Region 13, 704 F.2d at 1410, and Fields, 705 F. Supp. at 1136-37,
both relied on Davis in determining that the plaintiffs were not otherwise qualified for
the disputed jobs.
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ties. " Thus, for example, the Fifth Circuit upheld a mental health
center's decision to discharge a highly competent therapist because of
her persistent suicidal feelings and gestures, even though the center had
not considered any accommodations in hours, patient load, or ex-
tended leave of absence for treatment with a guaranteed job upon her
return. 01 Another court supported the decision of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture to fire a labor negotiator for his travel-related anx-
iety and off-duty kleptomania, although the agency never contemplated
any accommodations to his needs. 0 2 Other courts have found men-
tally disabled plaintiffs unqualified for their positions even with sub-
stantial accommodations to their needs.' 03
100. The Fifth Circuit in Region 13 explained: "[t]he 'Catch-22' implicit in virtu-
ally all section 504 actions is particularly evident in this case, that is: Ms. Doe was
required to prove her handicap for jurisdictional purposes, but simultaneously required
to prove that she was not so handicapped as to be unqualified to perform her job." 704
F.2d at 1408 n.6.
101. Id. at 1408-12. The employer felt that the plaintiff may have endangered her
patients by unconsciously condoning suicide or by abandoning them through her own
suicide. Id. at 1409. The employer offered the plaintiff a long-term leave for hospitali-
zation without a guaranteed job upon her return. Id. at 1405-07. Perhaps a more palat-
able accommodation could have been arranged had the parties negotiated. The court
ignored this possibility and concluded that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" in
spite of her illness. Id. at 1412.
102. Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1385
(4th Cir. 1989). Accommodations might have included progressive discipline, a leave of
absence for treatment, or a decrease in the employee's travel duties.
103. See, eg., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761,775-79 (2d Cir. 1981) (revers-
ing a preliminary injunction ordering a medical school to readmit plaintiff with border-
line personality disorder, finding that plaintiff's numerous suicide attempts and violent
attacks on others disqualified her from readmission to medical school); Adams v. Alder-
son, 723 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (D.D.C. 1989) ("One who is unable to refrain from doing
physical violence to the person of a supervisor... is simply not otherwise qualified for
employment"), aff'd sub nor. Adams v. G.S.A., No. 89-5265, 1990 WL 45737 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 10, 1990); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-19 (S.D.
Ohio 1988) (finding plaintiff who elected to go off her antipsychotic medication, en-
gaged in violent and threatening behavior, and took 464 days of leave without pay over
a period of several years was not otherwise qualified); Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 848 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1983) (finding plaintiff who suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder was not otherwise qualified because of aggressive out-
bursts against authority); Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1217, 1223 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 1983) (finding that postal worker with post-traumatic
stress disorder was not otherwise qualified for job requiring regular attendance, where
he had abandoned three previous jobs and had numerous "absent without leave" notices
in his record), aff'd on other grounds, 752 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1985); Guerriero v.
Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding that foreign service officer suffer-
ing from schizoid personality disorder and alcoholism was not otherwise qualified
where job required overseas service and necessary therapy was unavailable).
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The ADA reasonably permits employers to impose on their employ-
ees a qualification standard"° that they "not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."1 °5 Aside from
this compelling interest in protecting others, employers who wish to
avoid liability should attempt to negotiate accommodations with dis-
abled applicants or employees prior to rejecting or terminating them
for their inability to perform the essential functions of a job. 0 6 Reli-
ance on the Rehabilitation Act concerning the "otherwise qualified"
prong of the prima facie case is risky.
10 7
C. Accommodating Mentally Disabled Employees
Mentally disabled individuals confront several barriers to successful
employment. First, the symptoms of the disorder may impede work
performance. °8 Employees with mental retardation or learning disa-
104. The ADA provides:
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this [Act] that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or
tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disabil-
ity has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as re-
quired under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
105. Id. § 12113(b). "The determination that an individual with a disability will
pose a safety threat to others must be made on a case-by-case basis and not be based on
generalizations, misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or
pernicious mythologies." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 28, at 27. "For people with
mental disabilities, the employer must identify the specific behavior on the part of the
individual that would pose the anticipated direct threat... [and] the assessment that
there exists a high probability of substantial harm must be strictly based on valid medi-
cal analyses." H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 28, at 57, 73.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,736 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
107. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction
between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act regarding a plaintiff's qualifications for
the challenged job.
108. Massel et al., supra note 68, at 39; McCue & Katz-Garris, supra note 69, at 54-
55. Some researchers however, disclaim any significant correlation between psychiatric
symptoms and vocational outcome. See, e.g., William A. Anthony & Mary A. Jansen,
Predicting the Vocational Capacity of the Chronically Mentally Il: Research and Policy
Implications, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 537, 539 (1984) ("[Tjhere appear to be no symptoms or
symptom patterns that are routinely related to individual work performance"); Shar-
land Trotter et al., Supportive Work" An Innovative Approach to the Vocational Rehabili-
tation of Persons Who Are Psychiatrically Disabled, 33 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 27, 34 (1988)
(success in a supported work program "was found to be independent of psychiatric
diagnosis and severity of manifest symptomology").
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bilities may display difficulties in learning, comprehension, communi-
cation, social interactions, behavior, or movement." Individuals with
psychiatric illnesses may experience one or more of the following
symptoms: 110 delusions or hallucinations, high levels of distrac-
tibility,' social isolation or withdrawal, strange behaviors, decreased
personal hygiene, agitation,"' confusion, anxiety,"' depression,114 sui-
cidal ideations, 115 poor insight and judgment,116 and impaired inter-
personal relationships. Mental illnesses may manifest themselves in
more subtle ways as well, such as extended and perhaps unauthorized
absences,117 poor work performance,11 violations of work rules,119
hostile and sometimes violent behavior toward others,12° or off-duty
109. ROBERT A. WEISGERBER ET AL., TRAINING THE HANDICAPPED FOR PRO-
DUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT 16-18 (1980).
110. This list is adapted from McCue & Katz-Garris, supra note 69, at 56-57. See
also Massel, supra note 68, at 39-40; WEISGERBER, supra note 109, at 18-19.
111. See, e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1989) (addressing
claims of a social security claims representative with neurological disorder who had
difficulty concentrating in a noisy environment).
112. See, eg., Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1985) (describing
plaintiff's tendency to become agitated, restless, hyperactive, irritable, and confused,
and to display explosive and violent behavior during manic phases).
113. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 787 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that traffic
and weekend work aggravated postal worker's anxiety disorder); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F.
Supp. 1134, 1135 (D. Md. 1988) (noting federal labor negotiator's anxiety over work-
related travel), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989).
114. See, eg., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704
F.2d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting therapist's severe depression and threats to
colleagues that she would commit suicide).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio
1988) (addressing plaintiff's election to cease taking antipsychotic medication).
117. See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 787 (1st Cir. 1989) (postal service em-
ployee often absent due to anxiety disorder); Fong v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 705 F.
Supp. 41, 42-43 (D.D.C. 1989) (federal employee with post-traumatic stress disorder
and secondary alcoholism was absent 443 hours over a six month period, sometimes
without leave); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1217 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(psychotic postal worker took 464 days of leave without pay during a 3.5 year period).
118. See, e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1989) (social
security worker with neurological impairment had trouble comprehending written and
spoken language and displayed poor handwriting, spelling, and organizational skills).
119. See, eg., Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 945-46 (D.D.C. 1988)
(plaintiff who suffered from alcoholism and depression failed to finish assignments and
received reprimands for insubordination).
120. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 (2d Cir. 1981) (applicant
for medical school assaulted her doctors and nurses numerous times, attempted suicide,
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misconduct. 121
Second, aside from these symptoms, formerly-institutionalized indi-
viduals may display deficits in social functioning and basic work
skills.122 While their peers progressed through school, formative em-
ployment experiences, and relationships, hospitalized patients may
have learned a passive victim role123 which is incompatible with suc-
cessful employment and adult relationships. 124
Third, mentally disabled individuals must contend with the stigma
of their illnesses.125 Co-workers and supervisors, like others in society,
often do not understand the causes and manifestations of mental ill-
ness. 126 Because of their lack of understanding, they may act on the
basis of myths and stereotypes, such as the misconception that men-
and engaged in self-mutilating behavior); Adams v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531, 1531
(D.D.C. 1989) (plaintiff with adjustment disorder and compulsive personality disorder
assaulted a female supervisor and damaged office equipment), aff'd sub nom. Adams v.
G.S.A., No. 89-5265, 1990 WL 45737 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 1990); Franklin v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1215-17 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (postal worker suffering from psy-
chosis acted belligerently toward co-workers and the public); Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 840-42 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1983) (employee disobeyed
office policy and verbally attacked his supervisor).
121. See, e.g., Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1134 (D. Md. 1988) (labor negoti-
ator with record of numerous arrests and convictions for off-duty kleptomania), aff'd,
888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989); Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1216
(S.D. Ohio 1988) (schizophrenic postal worker arrested for writing bad checks, de-
frauding a livery, assault, and disorderly conduct); Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp.
511, 512 n.2 (D.D.C. 1983) (foreign service officer with schizoid personality disorder
and alcoholism engaged in "abnormal sex acts" in a bar).
122. McCue & Katz-Garris, supra note 69, at 54-55. The most significant predictor
of vocational success among severely mentally ill persons is a prior employment history.
Donna L. Stauffer, Predicting Successful Employment in the Community for People with
a History of Chronic Mental Illness, 6 Occup. THER. IN MENTAL HEALTH, Summer
1986, at 31, 46.
123. McCue and Katz-Garris explain: "The reality in which [patients] previously
functioned adequately (the psychiatric hospital) is no longer available, replaced by the
new reality of the community and its accompanying pressure and stress. Coping meth-
ods learned in the hospital do not apply to the new environment and thus result in
adjustment difficulties." McCue & Katz-Garris, supra note 69, at 55.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. One study found that employers fear that mentally ill employees will become
violent, suffer a relapse, or engage in bizarre behavior, or that they will not be able to
tolerate the pace of work. S. Olshansky et al., Employers' Attitudes and Practices in the
Hiring of Ex-Mental Patients, 42 MENTAL HYGIENE 391 (1958), cited in McCue &
Katz-Garris, supra note 69, at 55.
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tally ill people are violent." 7 By enacting the ADA, Congress sought
to eliminate stereotypic assumptions concerning disabled persons' abili-
ties to work and contribute to society. 28
In order to meet their obligations under the ADA, employers must
help mentally disabled employees cope with the symptoms of their ill-
nesses, the residual effects of institutionalization, and the stereotypical
attitudes of colleagues. 29 Employers should consider the following
127. ROBERT C. CARSON & JAMES N. BUTCHER, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND
MODERN LiE 6 (9th ed. 1992) ("A typical former mental patient is no more volatile or
dangerous than a 'normal' person. The exceptions to this rule generate much publicity
and give a distorted picture"). Cf. John Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behav-
ior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 511, 519 (1992) (explaining that, while
psychotic patients are significantly more likely than non-psychotic individuals to be-
come violent, approximately 90% of mentally ill persons are not violent).
128. In its Statement of Findings, Congress noted:
[UIndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society....
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). The Senate Conference Report quoted from the Supreme
Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987):
"[S]ociety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicap-
ping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." S. REP. No.
116, supra note 28, at 23-24.
During Floor debates, Senator Domenici spoke directly about stereotypes regarding
mental illness:
Think back in all our lives when we used terminology like "schizophrenia" or "that
is schizophrenic." We all perceive some idea in our minds about people who have
those kinds of ailments. It turns out that more times than not, we are wrong in or
[sic] perception of their abilities... [C]learly the time has come when they deserve
an unbiased evaluation of their capability based upon the disease rather than some
subjective disability attached to just the use of the name.
135 CONG. REc. 510,779 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
129. While employers are obligated to accommodate the needs of mentally disabled
employees, they need not, of course, become a provider of mental health services. The
EEOC guidelines specifically excuse employers from making accommodations that are
"primarily for the personal benefit of the individual with a disability," such as a wheel-
chair, eyeglasses, or a prosthetic limb. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,747 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9). Presumably this same rationale applies to mental
health treatment. Nor need employers create sheltered workshops or supported em-
ployment. Id. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text discussing undue hard-
ship. Nonetheless, the literature on sheltered workshops and other forms of supported
employment can help employers in identifying reasonable accommodations they should
make under the ADA. See generally Jane L. Dulay & Mary Steicher, Transitional Em-
ployment for the Chronically Mentally Ill, 2 Occup. THER. IN MENTAL HEALTH 65
(1982).
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types of accommodations when consulting with mentally disabled em-
ployees or applicants:
1. designing an environment that contains minimal levels of
distraction, 
130
2. distributing work evenly over time in order to reduce
stress, 
13 1
3. limiting the number of people with whom the employee
must interact,
1 32
4. providing appropriate levels and methods of supervision
133
and detailed feedback regarding work performance,
134
5. providing appropriately-structured training for the develop-
ment of new or remedial skills,
135
130. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 56. Grossman suggests, for example, moving the
employee to a more isolated work area in order to reduce noise levels and other sources
of distraction. Id.
131. Id. at 57.
132. Id.
133. Id. Depending on the employee, the appropriate level of supervision may be
"close, moderate, or minimal" and provided in a permissive or firm manner. Grossman
suggests that clearly-delineated lines of authority will reduce ambiguity and uncer-
tainty. Id.
134. Supervisors may need to assist mentally disabled employees in modifying a
specific inappropriate behavior or in improving concentration through coaching and
graduated, structured practice. See, e.g., Patrice T. English, The Use of Isolation Time-
Out with a Disabled Adult in a Regular Work Setting: A Case Study, J. REHAB., Jul.-
Sept. 1987, at 67 (analyzing the use of isolation time out to modify employee's inappro-
priate laughter); David W. Foy et al., Modeled Assertion in a Case of Explosive Rages, 6
J. BEHAV. THER. & EXPER. PSYCHIATRY 135 (1975) (analyzing the use of assertiveness
training in treating individual who expressed hostility in an abusive manner); Kim T.
Mueser et al., Social Skills Training for Job Maintenance in a Psychiatric Patient, 33 J.
COUNS. PSYCHOL. 360 (1986) (describing the successful use of social skills training);
Frank R. Rusch & Bruce M. Menchetti, Increasing Compliant Work Behaviors in a
Non-Sheltered Work Setting, 19 MENTAL RETARD. 107 (1981) (noting a drastic in-
crease in compliant behavior following practice and warnings); Fraser N. Watts, Modi-
fication of the Employment Handicaps of Psychiatric Patients by Behavioral Methods, 30
AM. J. Occup. THER. 487 (1976) (recommending behavior modifications methods such
as behavioral training incentives and behavioral counseling). Supervisors could also im-
prove mentally disabled employees' productivity through incentives and reduce their
anxiety through "graded exposure to anxiety-evoking cues." Watts, supra, at 489.
135. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 55-56. One author recommends accommoda-
tions in the training process itself. For mentally retarded employees, the trainer should
break instructions down into small steps; practice each before moving on; communicate
in concrete terms; provide alternate, simplified means for accomplishing a task; provide
positive reinforcement; avoid technical jargon; use teams to foster self-help; and remain
within the employees' attention spans. WEISGERBER, supra note 109, at 237-38. For
mentally ill employees, Weisgerber recommends the following accommodations: avoid-
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6. offering flexible hours to accommodate therapy sessions or
medication-induced drowsiness,
136
7. restructuring the individual's job duties to reduce stress and
optimize performance levels,1
37
8. reassigning the employees to vacant positions if they cannot
perform the essential functions of their current job with reason-
able accommodation, 138
9. providing sick leave, administrative leave, and leave with-
out pay as needed,1
3 9
10. offering leave of absence for treatment, 14
11. referring the individual for counseling at an in-house em-
ployee assistance program14 1 or some outside agency,142
ing distracting environments; utilizing positive reinforcement; remaining within the em-
ployees' attention spans; avoiding frustrating tasks or approaching them gradually; and
avoiding deadlines or rush jobs. Id. at 238.
136. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 111-22-23.
137. GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 57. The author recommends that the employer
assign either repetitious or diverse tasks, whichever the individual finds less stressful.
Id. Job restructuring is one of the reasonable accommodations specifically listed in the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The EEOC's interpretive guidelines explain: "An em-
ployer or other covered entity may restructure a job by reallocating or redistributing
nonessential, marginal job functions." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,744 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)).
138. The ADA interpretive guidelines list reassignment to a vacant position as a last
resort accommodation for an employee. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,744 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)). Job applicants cannot request reassignment to a position for
which they are not qualified. Id.
139. The EEOC's interpretive guidelines to the ADA note: "[O]ther accommoda-
tions could include permitting the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional
unpaid leave for necessary treatment.... ." Id. The ADA does not require, however,
employers to give extra paid leave to disabled employees. S. REP. No. 116, supra note
28, at 31.
140. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,744 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)).
141. Employers establish employee assistance programs (EAPs) to address employ-
ees' personal problems, either through in-house counseling or information and referral
services. WALTER E. SCANLON, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORK-
PLACE: EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 17 (1986). There are about 5,500 EAPs in
this country. Maria Roberts-DeGennaro, The Case Management Model in Employee
Assistance Programs, 1 EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE Q. 63, 63 (1986). Approximately 26
million workers in private industry and 10 million in the public sector have access to
EAPs. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS: VOL. I 121-22 (1990).
142. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ. 666 F.2d 761, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1981) (medical
school revoked its demand that plaintiff withdraw from school, contingent upon her
successful completion of psychotherapy). Employer-initiated referrals are especially ef-
fective for depressed employees and substance abusers who seldom seek treatment
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12. applying progressive discipline,14 3 or
13. educating colleagues and supervisors about the nature of
mental disabilities and how to assist a mentally disabled co-worker
with functioning on the job. 1
An employer need not make any accommodation that would cause it
undue hardship.'4 5 A finding of undue hardship depends on the cost of
the accommodation, the size and financial stability of the business, the
financial resources of any "parent" organization, the employer's type of
operation, and the impact of the accommodation on the employer's
workforce.' 4 6 While a serious adverse impact on other employees con-
stitutes a good defense,147 generalized claims of poor morale, 14 absen-
teeism, or safety problems 4 9 do not suffice. If an employer cannot
afford to accommodate the employee's needs after considering alter-
nate sources of funding, the employer must still give the employee the
option of financing his or her own accommodation. 50
themselves. Keith McClellan, Early Intervention into Addictive and Mental Health Dis-
orders, 5 EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE Q. 71, 74 (1990).
143. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bell, 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 839, 840-42 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 9, 1983) (plaintiff received numerous warnings and written reports; employer
retracted her notice of termination, contingent upon compliance with specified
conditions).
144. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at 111-15 (employer
cannot claim undue hardship based on poor morale of coworkers; instead, employer
should provide "awareness training").
145. EEOC regulations provide that employers may assert undue hardship as a de-
fense to an accommodation demand. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,737 (1991) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)). See supra note 30 for the ADA definition of undue hardship.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). The EEOC's interpretive guidelines note that un-
due hardship encompasses more than financial circumstances. "'Undue hardship' re-
fers to any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or
disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business."
56 Fed. Reg. at 35,744 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p)). See supra notes
30-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of undue hardship under the ADA.
147. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,752 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d)) (em-
ployer may show that the "provision of a particular accommodation would be unduly
disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its business.").
148. Id. Rehabilitation Act cases reach a similar result. See, e.g., Callicotte v. Car-
lucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 951 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that "serious morale problems"
among plaintiff's colleagues did not excuse the federal employer from accommodating
his depression and alcoholism).
149. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,745 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r)); S. REP.
No. 116, supra note 28, at 28. One study showed vague fears of increased absenteeism
and accidents to be unfounded. Wolfe, Disability is No Hardship for du Pont (1973),
cited in S. REP. No. 116, at 29.
150. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,745 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p)). The
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The Department of Labor' 51 sponsored a study of reasonable accom-
modations' 52 provided by federal contractors under section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act. According to the study, most accommodations for
mentally disabled employees cost little. Seventy percent of the accom-
modations provided to mentally retarded persons and fifty percent of
those afforded mentally ill individuals cost nothing.' 5 3 Only sixteen
percent of accommodations provided to mentally retarded employees
and twenty-two percent of accommodations made for mentally ill em-
ployees cost over $500.154 The study overlooked, however, the poten-
tially high cost of extended leaves of absence due to mental
disorders.' 5 5 Prolonged absences could eventually amount to undue
hardship for many employers.
Ultimately, the ADA requires that the employer engage the disabled
employee in an informal, interactive process 56 to decide whether rea-
EEOC interpretive guidelines recommend that employers seek funding from state voca-
tional rehabilitation agencies or claim federal, state, or local tax deductions or credits.
Id.
151. Frederick C. Collignon, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in Employing
Disabled Persons in Private Industry, in DIsABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 196,
197 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 1986) (citing BERKELEY PLANNING As-
SOCIATES, A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES
BY FEDERAL CONTRACTORS: FINAL REPORT (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Stan-
dards Administration 1982)).
152. The study enumerated, but unfortunately did not define, the following accom-
modations by federal contractors:
removed barrier; adjusted work environment; adjusted table, desk; other rearrange-
ment; relocated work site; modified phone, typewriter; microfilm, dictaphone;
other special equipment; job transportation or mobility; reassigned tasks; modified
work hours; other modification of work procedure; assigned aides, reader; addi-
tional training; oriented co-workers, supervisors; transferred to another job; other
accommodation.
Id. at 220-23 (citing BERKELEY PLANNING ASSOCIATES).
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 224-25.
155. Provided an employee uses only accrued leave or takes leave without pay, the
employer theoretically loses nothing if it can hire a temporary replacement to perform
the disabled employee's duties. If the employer cannot hire a temporary substitute,
however, it may lose a great deal in terms of lost productivity.
156. The applicable regulation is permissive in nature: "To determine the appropri-
ate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an
informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability .... " 56
Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)). The
EEOC's interpretive guidelines, however, indicate that an employer should negotiate
with the employee unless the appropriate accommodation is "so obvious" that confer-
ring would serve no purpose. Id. at 35,748 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
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sonable accommodations are feasible or would constitute undue hard-
ship on the employer. Even if the requested accommodations would
constitute an undue hardship, employers should negotiate the matter
and document their decisions.
D. Case Illustrations
The following case studies illustrate the types of problems employers
may encounter among mentally disabled employees and recommend
resolutions that comply with the ADA.
Case #1. James Darnell experienced his first symptoms of
schizophrenia'1 7 at age twenty-five, after he completed a masters
degree in computer science. Darnell was hospitalized numerous
times during the last ten years for the treatment of delusions and
self-mutilating behavior. He now effectively controls his disorder
with antipsychotic medications. He has been out of the hospital
for over two years, though he continues to receive outpatient ther-
apy. During the past ten years, Darnell has worked sporadically
as a sales agent for a computer company. Seeking a more chal-
lenging position, he has applied for a programmer position with
the Midwest Software Corporation. Midwest's hiring partner is
impressed with Darnell's education and intelligent demeanor but
is concerned about the gaps in his work history. Darnell explains
that he had health problems requiring extended treatment but an-
ticipates no difficulty in performing the programmer's job. The
hiring partner asks, "What kinds of health problems have you
had?" Upon learning that Darnell suffers from schizophrenia, the
partner decides that Midwest should reject him, because he
presents too many risks to himself, his co-workers, and to Mid-
west's productivity.
While Midwest's concerns with Darnell's spotty work history are
legitimate, the company has crossed the fine line between permissible
and impermissible inquiries. The ADA flatly prohibits employers from
asking job applicants about any current or past disability prior to a
conditional job offer."' The hiring partner could have asked Darnell
157. See supra note 73 for the definition of schizophrenia.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Once an employer has extended a conditional job
offer, it may require the applicant to submit to a medical examination or an inquiry if all
applicants in that job category are required to do so. Id. § 12112(d)(3); TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at VI-1. Unlike medical exams and inquiries
which an employer may require of current employees, exams and questioning of condi-
tionally-accepted applicants need not be "job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A); TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, at VI-1 (noting
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whether he was able to comply with Midwest's attendance require-
ments. 159 He probably could have inquired whether Darnell had any
problems that would affect his competence and productivity as a
programmer and his ability to work with colleagues on a team. 160
Nevertheless, the partner could not have asked Darnell to submit to a
psychological test unless all job applicants were required to take the
same test. 161 Midwest could have rejected Darnell on the basis of his
inconsistent work record alone.1 62  It could not reject him, however,
on the basis of his schizophrenia, unless he presented a direct threat to
the health and safety of others163 or the illness prevented him from
that an employer may make inquiries about previous injuries and workers compensation
claims). However, if an employer withdraws its offer based on such an exam or inquiry,
its reasons for rejecting the applicant "must be job-related and necessary for the busi-
ness." TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, at VI-l.
159. The ADA provides: "A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries
into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related functions." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(4)(B). See also TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 17, at V-9
("An employer may ask questions to determine whether an applicant can perform spe-
cific job functions.").
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B). But see Barbara Berish Brown, Reasonable Ac-
commodation, Undue Hardship, and Employer Defenses Under the ADA, in EMPLOYER
COMPLIANCE WITH THE AMERICANS WrrH DISABILITIES AcT 91, 104-05 (Alan M.
Koral & Bruce McLanahan eds., 1990) ("Even a question that asks 'do you have any
physical or mental conditions that would prevent you from performing your job func-
tions?' cannot be asked.").
161. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). In contrast, an employer may require a current em-
ployee to submit to a medical exam if it "is shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity." Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
162. The ADA provides: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability .... ." Id. § 12112(a). Accordingly,
an employer taking adverse actions for reasons other than disability would not violate
the Act. As in many employment discrimination cases, ascertaining the employer's mo-
tivation can be far from easy. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the McDonnell Douglas burden of proof designed to ferret out an employer's
invidious motive.
163. An employer claiming that the disabled applicant would create risks in the
workplace must meet a heavy burden:
An employer ... is not permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an indi-
vidual with a disability merely because of a slightly increased risk. The risk can
only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of substan-
tial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient .... For individuals with
mental or emotional disabilities, the employer must identify the specific behavior
on the part of the individual that would pose the direct threat .... Such considera-
tion must rely on objective, factual evidence-not on subjective perceptions, irra-
tional fears, patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes-about the nature or effect of a
particular disability ....
56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,745 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r)).
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performing the essential functions of the position with or without rea-
sonable accommodation. 164
Case #2. For the past twelve years, Carla Macklin has had a
successful career as a producer for Albright Advertising Com-
pany. She has earned outstanding performance appraisals and has
established strong, lasting customer relationships. She is quiet,
pleasant, and somewhat self-effacing. Macklin has managed her
recurring, moderate mood swings with medication and therapy
and has seldom missed work.
During the past month, however, Macklin's behavior has
changed dramatically. She worked fifteen hour days without
breaks. On one occasion she proposed an outlandish, exorbitant
advertising campaign to a customer. When he declined her offer
she shouted angrily, "You don't know what an opportunity you're
passing up!" Worst of all, without authorization, she "borrowed"
$5,000 from one of her customer's accounts to develop an elabo-
rate, yet unapproved, TV commercial. Albright fired Macklin
for antagonizing customers and using their funds without
authorization.
Macklin's therapist convinced her to enter the hospital, where
she was treated successfully for a manic episode. 165 She left the
hospital with medication and a good prognosis, but without a job
to which to return.
Albright can argue that it terminated Macklin because of her mis-
conduct rather than because of her manic condition. 166 When, as here,
an employee's disability causes her to engage in misconduct, such a
distinction is tenuous. Congress specified in the ADA that employers
may hold alcoholics and drug users to the same standards of conduct
as other employees, even if their misconduct stems from their disabili-
ties.167 The absence of any parallel provision for mentally disabled in-
dividuals suggests that Congress intended employers to attempt to
164. An employer cannot reject a disabled individual as unqualified for employment
because of his disability without first investigating whether the applicant could perform
the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8). Furthermore, the employer must negotiate with the job applicant
regarding feasible accommodations. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,736 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3)).
165. See supra note 74 for the definition of a manic episode.
166. Recall that an employer violates the ADA only if it takes adverse action "be-
cause of" a plaintiff's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See supra notes 52-54 and ac-
companying text describing this element of plaintiff's prima facie case.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1992). See infra note 215 and accompanying text for
discussion of the language and implications of this provision.
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accommodate mentally ill employees before firing them for miscon-
duct. Some Senators criticized the ADA for requiring accommodation
in this type of scenario.
68
Even if a court found that Albright fired Macklin because of her
mental disorder, the employer could still claim that Macklin was no
longer qualified for her position.1 69 Under the Rehabilitation Act, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College
v. Davis,'7 ° Macklin probably would have lost. By antagonizing and
taking advantage of her clients, Macklin demonstrated that she was not
otherwise qualified for a producer position in spite of her handicap.1
71
Under the ADA, however, Albright probably could not have dismissed
Macklin before negotiating with her over reasonable accommodations
that could enable her to perform her essential duties as producer.1
72
Reasonable accommodation might have included a brief leave of ab-
sence while Macklin obtained inpatient treatment. Alternatively, Al-
bright could have suspended her temporarily and offered her another
chance to improve her conduct. Albright might still prevail by proving
168. Senator Humphrey, for example, made the following remarks:
While the committee report gives examples of clear-cut accommodations for the
[physically] disabled, it studiously avoids the more bizarre accommodation require-
ments imposed by the bill. What are employers expected to do to accommodate
alcoholics, the mentally retarded, or persons with neurotic or psychotic disorders?
This Senator has no idea, and I doubt that other Senators do either.
135 CONG. REc. S10,783 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). Sena-
tor Rudman spoke along the same lines: "I have dilliculty with the notion that a psychi-
atric diagnosis of the cause of improper behavior should affect the legal rights of an
employer to take such behavior into account .... 1" 135 CONG. REc. S10,796 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Rudman).
169. The ADA does not protect disabled employees who cannot perform the essen-
tial functions of their position with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text discussing this qualification
element of plaintiff's case.
170. 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
171. See id. For discussion of Davis and the Court's holding, see supra notes 55-57
and accompanying text.
172. The ADA defines qualified disabled individuals as those who can perform the
essential functions of their position with or without reasonable accommodation. 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). The EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines
require the employer to confer informally with the disabled employee about reasonable
accommodation. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,736 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(3)) and 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,748 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
But see Voss, supra note 16, at 940-42 (urging courts to distinguish misconduct from
the underlying disability and to permit adverse action based on the former).
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that any accommodations would have caused it undue hardship,
173
particularly if lucrative clients pulled out of the firm after Macklin's
misbehavior. 74 Even so, Albright should have conferred with Macklin
over these options and built a record to use in court.
III. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF PSYCHOACTIVE
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT AND THE ADA
A. Scope of the Problem
Estimates of the prevalence of psychoactive substance use disor-
ders175 vary because researchers apply different definitions of drug and
alcohol use and abuse. 17 6 Depending on the criteria researchers use,
between 5 and 15 percent of the United States' population has a drink-
ing problem.17 7 One study estimates that 5.5 to 5.8 percent of the pop-
ulation abuses or is or has been dependent on drugs. 178  Eighteen
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) and 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,737 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.9(a)).
174. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a description of the factors that
enter into the determination of an undue hardship. In reality, the larger and wealthier
the employer, the less likely it will prevail on this defense.
175. See supra note 13 for the American Psychiatric Association's definition of
psychoactive substance use disorder.
176. M. Susan Ridgely et al., Chronic Mentally Ill Young Adults with Substance
Abuse Problems: A Review of the Relevant Literature and Creation of a Research
Agenda 11 (Nov. 1986) (unpublished manuscript from University of Maryland School
of Medicine)(citing D. Hasin et al., Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Patients with Affective
Syndromes, 26 COMP. PSYCHIATRY 283 (1985)).
177. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 105 (finding that between 5 and 10% of
the population are problem drinkers, depending on rigidity of the criteria); BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIAL REPORT, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE:
COSTS, CONTROLS, AND CONTROVERSIES 13 (1986) (surveying scope of alcohol abuse);
MICHAEL D. NEwCOMB, DRUG USE IN THE WORKPLACE: RISK FACTORS FOR DIs-
RUPTIVE SUBSTANCE USE AMONG YOUNG ADULTS 6 (1988) (citing 1980 study that
10% of the workforce have drug and alcohol problems); SCANLON, supra note 141, at 2
(citing study finding the rate of alcoholism among workforce to be 10%); W. SMITH, A
PROFILE OF HEALTH AND DISEASES IN AMERICA (1989), cited in CARSON &
BUTCHER, supra note 127, at 296 (finding that 7% of adults aged 18 or older are prob-
lem drinkers); Gary F. Kohut & Virginia T. Geurin, Attitudes of Personnel Managers
Toward Substance Abuse Policies, 21 J. DRUG ISSUES 493, 493 (1991) (noting that at
least 10% of population is afflicted with alcoholism or drug abuse); Lee N. Robins et al.,
Lifetime Prevalence of Specific Psychiatric Disorders in Three Sites, 41 ARCH. GEN. PSY-
CHIATRY 949, 952 (1984) (setting figure at 11% to 16%).
178. Robins et al., supra note 177, at 952. The Institute of Medicine recently re-
ported that of an estimated 14.5 million Americans over age 12 who use illegal drugs,
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percent of Americans in their early twenties report using alcohol at
work or school one to five times during the past six months; close to 17
percent use marijuana and 12 percent use hard drugs as frequently. 179
Mentally ill individuals abuse substances at perhaps twice the rate of
the general population; up to 50 percent of psychiatrically disabled per-
sons under age forty abuse psychoactive substances. '8 Unemployment
rates among alcoholics and drug addicts range from 10 to 37 per-
cent.181 Drug users who do work report lower than average in-
comes.182 Estimates place the cost of alcohol and drug abuse to the
nation at up to $100 billion annually in lost productivity and medical
expenditures. 183
B. Treatment of Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
Neither the original Rehabilitation Act nor its legislative history ad-
dressed alcohol or drug abusers.18 4 Later, the Attorney General.. 5 and
several district courts' 8 6 determined that the Rehabilitation Act did
1.5 million clearly need treatment, and 3.1 million probably need treatment. INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, supra note 141, at 79-80 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG
ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES
1988 (1989)).
179. NEWCOMB, supra note 177, at 35.
180. Vivian B. Brown et al., The Dual Crisis: Mental Illness and Substance Abuse,
44 AM. PSYCHOL. 565, 566 (1989).
181. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 141, at 80 (stating that 10% of the esti-
mated 4.6 million Americans who have a clear or a probable need for drug treatment
are unemployed); Rebecca M. Renwick & Marta Krywonis, Personal and Environmen-
tal Factors Related to Employment: Implications for Substance Abuse Intervention, 58 J.
REHAB. 23 (1992) (noting the mean rate of unemployment amongst substance abuse
clients to be 37%).
182. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 141, at 80 (noting that of the estimated
4.6 million individuals who have a clear or probable need for drug treatment, 32% earn
less than $9,000 per year, and 38% earn between $9,000 and $20,000).
183. NEWCOMB, supra note 177, at 6 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG
ABUSE, CONSENSUS SUMMARY: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE (1986) (estimating the cost to be $100 billion
annually)); TIA SCHNEIDER DENENBERO & R.V. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND
DRUGS: ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE V (1983) (same).
184. Henderson, supra note 16, at 727.
185. Rehabilitation Act of 1973--Coverage of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts, 43 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 12, at 3 (1976).
186. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ. of City of New York, 461 F.
Supp. 99, 106 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)(suggesting in dictum that defendant would have no
grounds upon which to challenge plaintiff's classification of alcoholism as a handicap);
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protect drug and alcohol abusers. Following employer lobbying ef-
forts, 187 Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1978 to exclude
from the definition of handicapped individuals drug or alcohol users
who could not perform their duties safely or effectively.188 Several
judges have read the 1978 amendment as restricting Rehabilitation Act
coverage to alcoholics and drug addicts who no longer use sub-
stances.1 89 Most courts, however, have assumed that current sub-
stance users can maintain handicap claims so long as they can perform
their jobs safely and effectively. 9° The Second Circuit,1 91 for example,
upheld the discharge of a heroin-addicted police officer, not because of
his current heroin use, but because such use rendered him unfit for
duty. Having found that the plaintiff did not fall within the definition
of a handicapped individual under the 1978 amendment, the court
made no further inquiry. 192
Drug addicts and alcoholics must make out the same prima facie
Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 795-96 (E.D. Pa. 1978)(concluding that drug addic-
tion fits within the definition of handicapped).
187. Henderson, supra note 16, at 728.
188. See supra note 62 for the text of the 1978 amendment. Note that the amend-
ment did not alter the affirmative action obligation of federal agencies under § 501, and
at least two courts have held that federal agencies cannot automatically take adverse
action against plaintiffs who would be denied protection under the amendment. Crewe
v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1987) (although
alcoholic employee could maintain an action against her federal employer under § 501
despite her impaired job performance, she failed to present any evidence of feasible
accommodation); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129-31 (D.D.C. 1984) (alco-
holic employee with excessive absences prevailed against the Department of Labor even
though a federal grantee or contractor could have fired him for inability to perform his
job), aff'd, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
189. See, e.g., Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("The
legislative history of the Act supports the contention that only current drug or alcohol
abusers are excluded from the Act's protection."), aff'd sub nom. Nisperos v. McNary,
936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590,
597 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(holding that "section 504 protects only those otherwise qualified
drug abusers who have been or are being rehabilitated").
190. See, e.g., Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988)
(assuming police officer who used marijuana was handicapped, he failed to show he was
otherwise qualified for a law enforcement position), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989);
Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980) (Rehabilitation Act
protects current substance users, but plaintiff had no private right of action under
§ 503); McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (assuming marijuana use qualifies as impairment, plaintiff failed to establish a
substantial limitation on a major life activity).
191. Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986).
192. Id.
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case193 under the Rehabilitation Act as mentally ill individuals. Courts
have assumed without much discussion that alcoholism' 94 and drug
abuse1 95 constitute impairments under the Rehabilitation Act. In most
cases, the courts have accepted plaintiffs' claims that their impairments
substantially limit one or more major life activities.196 However, one
court ruled against applicants who were rejected for firefighter posi-
tions due to positive drug tests because they failed to show that their
marijuana use substantially limited their abilities to work outside the
fire department. 97
Courts that have reached the "otherwise qualified" element of the
prima facie case have ruled almost uniformly against plaintiffs with
substance use disorders. For instance, marijuana users have failed to
convince judges of their qualifications for law enforcement' 98 or public
safety' 99 jobs. Not surprisingly, one court declined to find an alcoholic
plaintiff qualified for his postal worker position after he attempted to
193. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text for a review of a plaintiff's
prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act.
194. See, eg., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[A]I-
coholism is a handicapping condition"); Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987) ("There can be little doubt that alcoholism is a handi-
cap"); Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1231 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that individuals with current or prior alcohol or drug abuse histories qualify as
handicapped); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 949 n.4 (D.D.C. 1988) ("There
is simply no dispute that plaintiff's alcoholism is a handicap for purposes of the Act.");
Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[A]loholism is a handi-
capping condition"), aff'd, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
195. See, e-g., Heron v. McGuire, 803 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding police
officer was not a "handicapped individual" because his heroin addiction rendered him
unfit for police work without addressing whether such an addiction qualifies as an im-
pairment); Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that
former cocaine addict demonstrated that employer regarded him as impaired), aff'd sub
nor. Nisperos v. McNary, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
196. Implicit in the holdings of many courts that conclude substance abusers are
"handicapped" is a finding of substantial limitation. See, eg., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869
F.2d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1989); Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d
140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944 (D.D.C. 1988).
197. McCleod v. City of Detroit, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 225, 228 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
198. See Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148-49 (3d Cir.
1988) (police officer who used illegal drugs was not otherwise qualified because he vio-
lated the very laws he is supposed to enforce), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
199. McCleod, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228 (finding that even if plaintiffs
were substantially limited by their marijuana use, they were not otherwise qualified for
firefighter positions because they jeopardized the public safety).
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kill his wife and himself while intoxicated.2' ° Another court upheld
the discharge of a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms after he pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide and driving
under the influence of alcohol.20 Under less egregious facts, the
Eighth Circuit upheld a district court's finding that an alcoholic job
applicant was unqualified because she did not promote the efficiency of
the civil service.2" 2 One court did find that a government attorney was
otherwise qualified for his position, because he performed his job well
and no longer used cocaine.20 3
Some alcoholic employees suing their federal agency employers 10
have bypassed the problematic "otherwise qualified" inquiry by joining
their Rehabilitation claims with claims under the Comprehensive Al-
cohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1970 (Alcohol Rehabilitation Act).20 5 The Alcohol
Rehabilitation Act requires federal agencies to establish alcoholism
treatment programs for their employees.206 The statute on its face does
200. Richardson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1216 (D.D.C. 1985) (em-
ployee's acts were a violation of Code of Ethical Conduct for Postal Employees).
201. Wilber v. Brady, 780 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1992). The court explained:
A disabled individual cannot be "otherwise qualified" for a position if he commits
misconduct which would disqualify an individual who did not fall under the pro-
tection of the statute .... [The Rehabilitation Act] is not designed to insulate
[disabled persons] from disciplinary actions which would be taken against any em-
ployee regardless of his status.
Id. at 840.
202. Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir.
1987). See also Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 10 (lst Cir. 1992) (postal worker fired for
possession of heroin with intent to distribute was not otherwise qualified, because em-
ployer could make no accommodations without sacrificing the integrity of the Postal
Service).
203. Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427-28 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd sub nom.
Nisperos v. McNary, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
204. See, eg., Burchell v. Dep't of Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393 (D.S.C. 1988) (Depart-
ment of Army employee), aff'd in relev. part sub nom. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d
253 (4th Cir. 1989); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984) (Depart-
ment of Labor employee), aff'd, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
205. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-616, tit. II, § 201, 84 Stat. 1849, as
amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-180, §§ 6(a), (b)(1), (b)(2)(B), 93 Stat.
1302, 1303, repealed by Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. VI, § 6004(a), 100
Stat. 3207-159 (1986).
206. Before its repeal in 1986, the relevant portion of the Alcohol Rehabilitation
Act provided:
The Office of Personnel Management shall be responsible for developing and main-
taining, in cooperation with the Secretary and with other Federal agencies and
departments... appropriate prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs
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not prohibit agencies from discharging alcoholic employees for poor
performance.2 °" The legislative history clarifies, however, Congress'
intent that Federal agencies permit alcoholics to retain their positions
until they refuse or fail to complete treatment. 20 8 The Alcohol Reha-
bilitation Act essentially requires federal employers to accommodate
employees' alcoholism even if they are not otherwise qualified for their
positions.
The Americans with Disabilities Act departs from the Rehabilitation
Act's treatment of substance use disorders in two respects. First, the
ADA excludes current users of illegal drugs2 "9 from the definitions of
"individual with a disability"2 10 and "qualified individual with a disa-
and services for alcohol abuse and alcoholism among Federal civilian employees,
consistent with the purposes of this Act. Such agencies and departments are en-
couraged to extend, to the extent feasible, these programs and services to the fami-
lies of alcoholic employees and to employees who have family members who are
alcoholics ....
The Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Reha-
bilitation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-616, tit. II, § 201, 84 Stat. 1849 (1970). On the
same date Congress repealed the above provision, it enacted a new statute imposing
similar duties on federal agencies: "The head of each Executive agency shall, in a man-
ner consistent with the guidelines prescribed under subsection (b) of this section and
applicable provisions of law, establish appropriate prevention, treatment, and rehabilita-
tion programs and services for drug abuse and alcohol abuse for employees in or under
such agency." Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. VI, § 6004(a), 100 Stat. 3207-159 (1986) (codi-
fied at 5 U.S.C. § 7904 (1988)).
207. One portion of the original Alcohol Rehabilitation Act, which was not re-
pealed, states: "[tihis section shall not be construed to prohibit the dismissal from em-
ployment of a Federal civilian employee who cannot function properly in his
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-l(c) (1988).
208. The Senate Report explained:
The committee expects that the alcoholic employee, like any other employee suffer-
ing from a disease, will now be provided with an opportunity for treatment instead
of being summarily discharged. Government employees with alcohol problems
should be dismissed only if they have refused to accept adequate and appropriate
treatment offered to them, and have subsequently failed to function properly in
their positions ...
S. REP. No. 1069, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1970).
209. "The term 'illegal use of drugs' means the use of drugs, the possession or distri-
bution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. § 812].
Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed
health care professional. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(6)(A).
210. The ADA provides: "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'individual with a
disability' does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of
drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." 42 U.S.C. § 12210(a).
Current use of drugs means use "that has occurred recently enough to indicate that the
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bility. ' '211 The ADA amended the Rehabilitation Act to exclude cur-
rent drug users as well.212 Congress wanted to avoid creating a
disability law that would undermine the Administration's war on
drugs.213 Drug addicts therefore can maintain a cause of action based
on their addiction214 only if they no longer use drugs, even off-duty.
Second, the ADA allows employers to hold alcoholics and drug ad-
dicts to the same standards of performance and conduct as those im-
posed upon non-disabled employees.215 If recovering alcoholics or
individual is actively engaged in such conduct." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,745-46 (1991)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.3(a)-(c)).
Congress clarified, however, that recovering addicts who no longer use drugs can
claim the protection of the ADA:
Nothing in [§ 12210(a)] shall be construed to exclude as an individual with a disa-
bility an individual who-
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is
no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer en-
gaging in such use; or
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging in such
use ....
42 U.S.C. § 12210(b).
211. The statute provides: "[Tihe term 'qualified individual with a disability' shall
not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of
drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use." 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a).
212. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. V, § 512,
104 Stat. 377 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)). The Rehabilitation Act now pro-
vides in relevant part: "[T]he term 'individual with handicaps' does not include an
individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when a covered entity
acts on the basis of such use." Id. § 706(8)(C)(i).
213. Senator Danforth made the following remarks during Floor debates:
Today, we are experiencing the societal consequences of Congress' earlier ambiva-
lence toward "a little illegal drug use." Today, we understand that illegal drug use
simply cannot be tolerated. [The ADA] must clearly reflect the current attitude
that President Bush aptly noted in his address on Tuesday: "our Nation has zero
tolerance" for illegal drug use. This provision makes it clear that an employer has
the right to insist that his employees are drug free at all times.
135 CONG. R1c. S10,796-97 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Sen-
ator Helms, who sponsored the amendment excluding current drug users from cover-
age, made similar remarks: "[The war on drugs will be lost if those who abuse drugs
are allowed to hide behind laws designed to help those who are seriously handicapped."
135 CONG. Rc. S10,775 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
214. Note that a drug addict comes within the ADA's coverage if the employer
takes adverse action based on some other qualifying disability. H.R. REP. No. 485,
supra note 28, at 77. See also 135 CONG. REc. SI0,775 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy).
215. Specifically, the ADA provides:
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drug users fail to conform their behavior to the required standards be-
cause of their disability, employers may take adverse action without
considering reasonable accommodations. In contrast, mentally ill em-
ployees who perform poorly or violate work rules due to their disability
may request accommodations such as training or leniency.21 6 Aside
from the above-noted differences, ADA plaintiffs with substance use
disorders can expect courts to follow Rehabilitation Act precedent.21 7
C. How Should Employers Accommodate Individuals With
Substance Use Disorders?
Alcoholics and drug-addicted employees may exhibit the following
symptoms: impaired work performance, 218  absenteeism, 219 tardi-
A covered entity
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an
alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance
and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c).
216. See supra notes 135 and 167-68 and accompanying text discussing accommo-
dations for mentally disabled individuals.
217. One author vociferously objects to the application of Rehabilitation Act stan-
dards to ADA cases. Voss, supra note 16, at 907-10. She notes that § 501 and § 503 of
the Rehabilitation Act seek to make model employers of federal agencies and contrac-
tors. Id. at 907-08. In § 504, she asserts, Congress premised liability on a quid pro quo
theory: in exchange for federal funds, grantees are expected to maintain exemplary
employment policies. Id. at 909. The ADA, in contrast, applies to private employers
engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of any connection to the federal govern-
ment. Extension of Rehabilitation Act standards to the ADA would be inappropriate,
Voss believes. Id. at 910-11. While this argument is persuasive, it overlooks the fact
that Congress specifically expressed its intent that Rehabilitation Act principles guide
the courts in ADA cases. See supra note 48 and accompanying text noting how the two
Acts are interrelated.
218. A chemically dependent employee may show poor judgment, make frequent
mistakes, have trouble concentrating, miss deadlines, experience trouble with complex
situations, or produce an uneven quality or quantity of work. BANTA & TENNANT,
supra note 13, at 48-49, 109. For additional examples of work performance problems
stemming from substance abuse problems, see Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's drinking problem interfered with
her work); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 945 (D.D.C. 1988) (alcoholic em-
ployee reprimanded for insubordination and failure to complete assignments).
219. BANTA & TENNANr, supra note 13, at 48-49. Drug addicts have twice as
many lengthy absences, seven times as many sick days, and three times as many tardy
days as other employees. Id. at 23. Alcoholics are absent more than twice as often as
other employees. Id. Many Rehabilitation Act cases focus on problems of absenteeism
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ness, 2 2 poor attitudes about work,"' or strained relationships with co-
workers.222 Substance abusers may display physiological symptoms 2 23
such as inappropriate euphoria, altered perception and judgment, im-
paired cognitive and motor functioning, confusion, slurred speech, or
excessive weariness, as well as psychological symptoms 224 such as
mood swings, depression, irritability, anxiety, suspicion, or social isola-
tion. Alcoholics or addicts may also cause or be involved with an ex-
cessive number of accidents225 and engage in off-duty misconduct.226
among chemically dependent employees. See, eg., Fong v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 705
F. Supp. 41, 42 (D.D.C. 1989) (alcoholic employee took hundreds of hours of leave,
some without authorization); Callicotte v. Carlucci, 698 F. Supp. 944, 945-46 (D.D.C.
1988) (alcoholic employee reprimanded for repeated absences); Burchell v. Dep't of
Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (D.S.C. 1988) (alcoholic employee frequently absent
without leave), aff'd in relev. part sub nom. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir.
1989); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1984) (alcoholic employee
had hundreds of hours of unscheduled leave).
220. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49 (listing tardiness among other
signs and symptoms of substance abuse); Patricia Owen & Jerry Spicer, When an Alco-
holic Employee Returns to Work- The Problems for Supervisors and Employees, I EM-
PLOYEE ASSISTANCE Q., Summer 1986, at 67, 71 (same).
221. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49 (listing a number of changes in
attitude a drug abuser may exhibit); Owen & Spicer, supra note 220, at 71 (same).
222. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49, 109. For example, substance
abusers may overreact to real or imagined criticism and may try to avoid their supervi-
sors or peers. Id. at 49. Colleagues may complain about the addict's moods or treat-
ment of others. Id. See also Burchell v. Dep't of Army, 679 F. Supp. at 1396 (alcoholic
employee displayed hostility toward supervisor).
223. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49; J. MICHAEL WALSH & STE-
PHEN C. YOHAY, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE: A GUIDE TO
THE ISSUES 20 (1987) (stating that the effects of drugs vary considerably). See also
Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1425-26 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (cocaine user exper-
ienced paranoid delusions and fired a gunshot at an imaginary intruder), aff'd sub nom.
Nisperos v. McNary, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
224. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49; DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at
178 (associated features of cocaine dependence) and 175 (associated features of amphet-
amine dependence); WALSH & YOHAY, supra note 223, at 20-22.
225. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 48-49, 109. Up to 40% of industrial
fatalities and 47% of industrial injuries are alcohol-related. BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 177, at 7.
226. See, e.g., Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (postal worker arrested for
possession of heroin with intent to distribute); Crewe v. U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, 834 F.2d 140, 141 (8th Cir. 1987) (alcoholic pleaded guilty to five alcohol-
related driving offenses); Wilber v. Brady, 780 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1992) (special
agent pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide caused by driving under the influence of
alcohol); Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (government
attorney terminated after arrest for being under the influence of cocaine and for posses-
sion of narcotic paraphernalia), aff'd sub nom. Nisperos v. McNary, 936 F.2d 579 (9th
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Even after successful completion of treatment, former substance abus-
ers may encounter ignorance or intolerance from colleagues or
supervisors.22 7
The ADA excuses employers from accommodating any current user
of illegal drugs2 28 and it limits their obligation to accommodate al-
coholics and drug addicts who no longer use illegal substances.2 2 9
Although the ADA does not require employers to provide treatment
for alcoholics and drug addicts,2 30 the legislative history reveals Con-
gress' hope that private employers will emulate the federal government
and give substance abusers opportunities for rehabilitation.2 31 Citing
federal personnel guidelines, the Fourth Circuit in Rodgers v. Leh-
man 232 prescribed the following accommodations for alcoholic em-
Cir. 1991); Burchell v. Dep't of Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (D.S.C. 1988) (alcoholic
employee convicted three times of drunk driving), aff'd in relev part sub nom. Rodgers
v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
227. Owen & Spicer, supra note 220, at 70-73. Researchers found that supervisors
and colleagues of recovering alcoholics lacked knowledge regarding the nature of alco-
holism, how closely alcoholics must be supervised, and what to expect from them. Id.
at 73. Supervisors expressed concern over possible relapse. Id. at 72. Alcoholics re-
turning to work after treatment felt that their co-workers no longer trusted them. Id. at
70. See also SCANLON, supra note 141, at 38-39 (citing examples of stigmatizing stereo-
types that impede recovery from alcoholism or drug addiction).
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(a), 12210(a). See supra notes 209-214 and accompanying
text for discussion of these provisions.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4). See supra note 215 and accompanying text for an
explanation of this provision. Note that former drug addicts may still suffer from cur-
rent impairments. For instance, some addicts develop "Post Drug Impairment Syn-
drome," which is characterized by permanent changes in brain chemistry due to
excessive use of alcohol or drugs. BANTA & TENNANT, supra note 13, at 45-46.
230. The Senate Report provided:
The reasonable accommodation provision in section 102(b)(5) of this title does not
affirmatively require that a covered entity must provide a rehabilitation program or
an opportunity for rehabilitation for any job applicant who is a drug addict or
alcoholic or for any current employee who is a drug addict or alcoholic ....
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 28, at 41-42. Accord 135 CONG. RFc. SI0,777 (daily ed.
Sept. 7, 1989) (statements of Sen. Coats and Sen. Harkin).
231. The Senate Report elaborated:
Although the provision of a rehabilitation program or an opportunity for rehabili-
tation of a drug addict or alcoholic is not required by this title, the Committee
strongly encourages covered entities to follow the lead of the Federal government
and many private employers, consistent with the policy embedded in the Drug Free
Workplace Act, to offer such rehabilitation programs or provide an opportunity for
rehabilitation.
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 28, at 42.
232. 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989).
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ployees, which are equally applicable to former drug addicts:
1. Conduct an interview with the employee to discuss inade-
quate work performance and available treatment services.
2. If the employee refuses assistance and continues to perform
poorly, offer a "firm choice" between treatment or discipline.
3. Offer the employee an opportunity to participate in an out-
patient treatment program for a reasonable amount of time. If
drinking continues, impose progressive discipline for job-related
misconduct.
4. If the employee leaves treatment, continues to drink, or en-
gages in job-related misconduct, grant him or her accrued or un-
paid leave to undergo inpatient treatment before resorting to
discharge.2 33
5. If the employee relapses after successful treatment and
work performance thereafter declines, a decision to discharge will
be presumed reasonable.
2 34
In addition, although not mentioned by the Rodgers court, employers
should educate supervisors and co-workers about alcoholism and drug
addiction so as to ease a recovering employee's transition back into the
workplace.2 35  Upon closer observation, the accommodations sug-
gested by the Rodgers court parallel the "Constructive Confrontation"
model used by many employee assistance programs to combat sub-
stance abuse in industry.2 36
233. The employer would not have to grant an extended leave of absence if the
employee's absence would create an undue hardship. Id.
234. Id. The court stated that "only in a rare case, such as where a recovering
alcoholic has had a single relapse after a prolonged period of abstinence, can this pre-
sumption be rebutted." Id.
235. SCANLON, supra note 141, at 38-39 (noting that stereotypes and misconcep-
tions about alcoholics and drug abusers act as barriers in the workplace); see supra note
228 and accompanying text; WALSH & YoHAY, supra note 223, at 110-11 (stating that
supervisors and coworkers can be vital as networks during and after treatment). See
also supra note 227 and accompanying text noting the ignorance and intolerance of
employees.
236. SCANLON, supra note 141, at 32-33. A supervisor constructively confronts a
chemically dependent employee by:
1. recognizing a "pattern of deteriorating work performance";
2. documenting the performance problems;
3. imposing progressive discipline ("informed verbal warnings, corrective inter-
views, work suspensions, and/or termination");
4. referring the employee for treatment with the firm's employee assistance pro-
gram;
5. reintegrating the recovered employee into the workforce.
Id. Supervisors are often reluctant to confront their employees about substance abuse
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Based on the stringent obligations imposed by the Alcohol Rehabili-
tation Act,237 courts have required federal agencies to conform strictly
with their personnel guidelines. For example, one court permitted an
alcoholic to reapply for the dangerous position of boiler plant operator
with the Army even after he had three convictions for drunk driving;
took numerous absences without leave, forcing his colleagues to work
overtime; cursed at a supervisor while intoxicated; and dropped out of
his first treatment program.238 The Army counseled and reprimanded
the plaintiff on numerous occasions and revoked a four-day suspension
contingent upon his completion of a short-term treatment program.239
Holding that the Army's patience and tolerance did not discharge its
duty to accommodate reasonably the plaintiff's handicap, the court
emphasized the Army's failure to inform the employee of available
counseling services, apply progressive discipline after he left treatment,
offer extended leave, and consider him for disability retirement, all of
which are mandated by the personnel directive.24°
In another case, the Department of Labor attempted to accommo-
date an alcoholic employee by various means. 24' The agency referred
the plaintiff for counseling, warned him about his protracted absences,
and reduced a suspension to a reprimand contingent upon his partici-
pation in an agency treatment program.242 Before discharging him, the
Department also ordered two fitness-for-duty exams, granted him an-
nual leave for short-term treatment, offered him a transfer to a less
stressful job, and adjusted his hours.243 The court applauded the
agency for its compassion and patience, but found for the plaintiff be-
cause the agency failed to offer him an extended leave without pay for
treatment. 24
problems because they may be sympathetic, may identify with the employee's problems,
may drink or use drugs themselves, or may be afraid of hurting a friendship. Id. at 35-
36. Supervisors can minimize some of this awkwardness by focusing on the
subordinate's performance problems rather than the drinking per se. Id.
237. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text discussing the language and far-
reaching implications of the Alcohol Rehabilitation Act.
238. BurcheU v. Dep't of Army, 679 F. Supp. 1393, 1395-97 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd in
relev part sub non. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
239. Id. at 1396.
240. Id. at 1402.
241. Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984).
242. Id. at 134-35.
243. Id. at 135-36.
244. Id. at 136-37. But cf. Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1991) (af-
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It is unlikely that a court would impose such a rigorous accommoda-
tion duty on private employers that have no affirmative action obliga-
tions.24 In fact, the ADA specifically eases an employer's duty to
accommodate alcoholics and drug users.246 Nonetheless, employers do
have some accommodation obligations under the ADA,247 and the Al-
cohol Rehabilitation Act cases suggest some examples. Whether a
given accommodation amounts to an undue hardship depends on its
cost in relation to the employer's business and the extent to which it
disrupts other employees in the performance of their duties.248
D. Case Studies
The following case studies explore the application of the ADA to
individuals with psychoactive substance use disorders.
Case #3. William Cooper applied for and was offered a re-
search assistant position at Franklin College. The College re-
tracted its offer after Cooper tested positive for marijuana use
during his mandatory physical exam. Cooper insists that he
smokes marijuana only on the weekends. He also asserts that, as a
research assistant, he poses no risks to anyone in the workplace.
The College's personnel director responds that, regardless of the
firming summary judgment for the Postal Service, for it had attempted unsuccessfully to
accommodate an alcoholic and cocaine abuser by providing three referrals to an em-
ployee assistance program, leave without pay for treatment, and progressive discipline).
245. See Voss, supra note 16, at 910-11 (suggesting that courts should not apply
Rehabilitation Act standards to ADA claims, because Congress could not have in-
tended to hold private employers to the strict standards governing federal agencies,
contractors, and grantees).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (employer may hold alcoholics and drug users to the
same standards of performance and conduct as other employees, even if unsatisfactory
performance or behavior stems from alcohol or drug use). See supra note 215 and ac-
companying text discussing this provision.
247. Logically, some alcoholics and recovering addicts must be able to prevail, or
their inclusion in the ADA's coverage would mean nothing. Furthermore, the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines clarify: "Individuals disabled by alcoholism are entitled to the
same protections accorded other individuals with disabilities under this part." 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,739, 35,752 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(b)). One author
points to the "logical conundrum" created by the ADA: "[O]ne cannot easily reconcile
the notions of providing reasonable accommodation of a condition that impairs the abil-
ity to work and of holding an employee to a uniform standard of performance ....
Voss, supra note 16, at 916.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,736 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(p)). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
undue hardship defense.
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severity of Cooper's drug problem, the College flatly refuses to
hire drug users for any position.
Franklin College acted legally when it revoked its employment offer
to Cooper. Even if Cooper has an impairment that substantially limits
one or more of his major life activities, the ADA excludes him from
coverage because he currently uses illegal drugs.24 9 The case might
turn out differently if Cooper abused alcohol instead of marijuana. Al-
coholics come within the protection of the ADA even if they currently
engage in off-duty drinking.25° If Cooper could establish the disability
of alcoholism, he then would need to show that he is qualified2"' for
the research assistant position with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion for his alcoholism. If Cooper made out his prima facie case,
Franklin College might argue that all alcoholics pose a risk of harm to
others in the workplace.252 This generalization, however, would prob-
ably fail.253 To prevail, the College would have to present medical evi-
dence that Cooper himself endangers his colleagues through his
249. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(a), 12210(a). Sponsors of the ADA explained: "[N]o
one who currently uses illegal drugs is entitled to any employment protections under the
ADA, regardless of whether that person is a casual user of drugs or an addict and
regardless of whether his or her illegal drug use has any adverse impact on job perform-
ance." 135 CONG. Rrc. S10,777 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
250. The statute excludes only an employee or applicant "who is currently engaging
in the illegal use of drugs. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12114(a), 12210(a). The illegal "use of
drugs" refers to "the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Con-
trolled Substances Act." Id. § 12111(6)(A). The EEOC's guidelines clarify that
"[i]ndividuals disabled by alcoholism are entitled to the same protections accorded
other individuals with disabilities .... " 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,752 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(b)).
251. Qualified individuals with a disability are those who can perform the essential
functions of their positions with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). Cooper would have to show that his off-duty drinking does not impair his
work performance. He might also have to show that his off-duty drinking would not
disgrace Franklin College. See 135 CONG. REc. S10,782 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Harkin) ("Obviously, if a person works for someone and they are out
getting drunk every night, that reflects also upon the employer's workplace").
252. Recall that an employer may impose as a qualification standard the require-
ment that its employees not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others. 42
U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b). See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text for discussion of
the direct threat standard.
253. To maintain a direct threat defense, an employer must adduce medical analysis
or other objective evidence of the specific risks posed by the plaintiff. "Generalized
fears about risks" do not suffice. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,745 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2(r)). See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text for further discussion
of the sufficiency of evidence supporting a direct threat defense.
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drinking problem.254
Case #4. Diane Gifford, an admitted alcoholic, works as a
legal secretary at a large law firm. Gifford never comes to work
under the influence of alcohol and maintains a respectable attend-
ance record. Every night, however, she rushes home from the of-
fice to begin a heavy drinking binge.
One afternoon a senior partner asks Gifford to stay late and
help her prepare for trial. Gifford reluctantly agrees. As the eve-
ning wears on, she becomes increasingly anxious and irritable be-
cause she has not been able to consume any alcohol. Finally
Gifford tells the partner, "I can't stand this pressure anymore, I
have to go home." The partner fires her for insubordination.
Gifford contends that her alcoholism prevents her from working
during the evening hours and that the firm should have accommo-
dated her.
The ADA gives conflicting guidance as to how to deal with this sce-
nario. Gifford almost certainly can demonstrate that she suffers from
the disability of alcoholism. She may well prove that she can perform
the essential functions of her position with accommodation. For exam-
ple, if overtime constitutes an essential function of her job, perhaps she
can perform her overtime on weekends or early in the morning. Alter-
natively, maybe she can share overtime responsibilities with another
secretary. Even if Gifford makes out her prima facie case, the law firm
still may prevail because the ADA allows employers to impose the
same performance and behavior standards on alcohol and drug abusers
as on non-disabled employees.255 This provision seems to immunize
the firm from having to accommodate Gifford's disability in any way
and, furthermore, acts to contradict the EEOC's mandate that employ-
ers treat alcoholics like all other disabled individuals.256 Though the
provision's scope seems broad, perhaps Congress merely intended to
excuse employers from accommodating substance abusers who are
under the influence at work.257 Courts will have difficulty interpreting
254. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,745 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r)).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4). See supra note 215 and accompanying text for fur-
ther discussion of this provision.
256. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,752 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.16(b)).
257. The language of the provision itself supports this interpretation:
A covered entity-
(4) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an
alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance
and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory
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the scanty legislative history so as to answer that question.25 8
IV. CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act finally extends to disabled indi-
viduals the civil rights protections that were accorded other minority
groups decades ago. Notwithstanding vocal protests from some com-
mentators,259 the ADA reasonably requires employers to accommo-
date the needs of disabled employees and job applicants unless
accommodation would result in undue hardship.
While Congress gave expansive protection to the physically disabled,
it sought to limit coverage of mental disabilities and substance use dis-
orders. For purely political reasons, the ADA excludes from coverage
individuals with non-physiological sexual disorders, certain conduct
disorders, and those who currently use illegal substances. In addition,
the ADA permits employers to impose on drug addicts and alcoholics
the same performance and behavior standards governing all employees,
even if their noncompliance results solely from their disabilities.
Whether substance abusers can ever prevail under the statute thus re-
mains uncertain.
Both Congress and the EEOC paid little heed to the accommodation
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such employee
42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (emphasis added). On the other hand, alcoholism and drug
addiction can cause performance or behavior problems even in the absence of on-duty
intoxication. The American Psychiatric Association explains:
Repeated episodes of Psychoactive Substance-Induced Intoxication are almost
invariably present in Psychoactive Substance Abuse or Dependence, although for
some substances it is possible to develop dependence without ever exhibiting frank
intoxication (e.g., alcohol) ....
Personality disturbance and disturbances of mood are often present... Anxiety
or depression associated with Borderline Personality Disorder may be intensified
In chronic abuse or dependence, mood lability and suspiciousness, both of which
can contribute to violent behavior, are common.
DSM-III-R, supra note 12, at 171.
258. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 28, at 78; S. REP. No. 116, supra note
28, at 40-41; and 135 CONG. REc. S10,777 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statements of ADA
sponsor Sen. Harkin) (all summarizing but not explaining the provision at issue).
259. See, e.g., Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare
for Employers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 229 (1990) (discussing
the Act's burdens on employers and the likelihood of increased litigation); Eileen P.
Kelly & Robert J. Alberts, Americans with Disabilities Act: Undue Hardship for Private
Sector Employers?, 41 LAB. LJ. 675 (1990) (discussing the increased cost of compliance
for employers).
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needs of individuals with mental illnesses and substance use disorders.
Based on a review of the psychiatric and substance abuse literature, as
well as precedents under the Rehabilitation Act, this Note proposes
potential accommodations for persons with psychiatric and substance
use problems. The actual contours of an employer's obligation toward
mentally ill persons, alcoholics, and drug addicts will emerge slowly as
litigants wind their way through the courts.
Loretta K Haggard*
* J.D., M.S.W. 1993, Washington University.
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